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I. INTRODUCTION
In the late 1980s, state legislatures enacted statutory restrictions on
awards of punitive damages in response to the tort crisis in America.'
1. This Article assumes for the sake of argument that punitive damages are increasing
in both size and incidence; however, there is an ongoing dispute on whether there is a
tort crisis at all. Compare, e.g., Andrew Blum, Debate Still Rages on Torts, NAT'L L.J.,
Nov. 16, 1992, at 1, 32-33 (discussing the varying reports about whether there is indeed
a tort crisis and stating that studies may be biased) and Robert A. Clifford, Tort Reform
is Based on False Assumptions, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 19, 1992, at 12 (noting that studies
have shown that punitive damages awards are very rare, only 355 given over the past 25
years) and Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive
Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1277 (1993)
(questioning whether there is a tort crisis, noting that punitive damages are necessary to
insure corporate responsibility) and Jimmie 0. Clements, Jr., Comment, Limiting
Punitive Damages: A Placebo For America's Ailing Competitiveness, 24 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 197, 213-21 (1992) (stating that punitive damages are not out of control and will
not decrease competitiveness; caps will impact on safety and quality, and deprive
punitive damages of purpose) with Pacific Mut. Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 8-9 n.4,
18 (1991) (asserting that punitive damages have run wild; numerous amicus briefs filed
both in support of and against restrictions on punitive damages) and id. at 50-51
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (comparing wide range of awards in Alabama for similar
torts) and McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1567 (M.D. Ga. 1990)
(examining Georgia legislative history concerning the Tort Reform Act of 1987, noting
that authoritative sources disagreed about the existence of a tort crisis) and Dan Quayle,
Civil Justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559, 564-65 (1992) (maintaining that
unrestricted punitive damages awards discourage settlement because plaintiffs receive
larger awards unrelated to actual injury) and Charles D. Stewart & Philip G. Piggott,
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Not surprisingly, plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of these
statutes, contending that the legislation restricted their common-law
right to receive the full award.' But are plaintiffs fighting a losing
battle? Their lost causes litter the constitutional battlefield, for both
state and federal courts consistently have upheld the constitutionality of
the statutes.3 This growing judicial trend acknowledges the legislative
power to subordinate the public interest in awarding plaintiffs punitive
damages to other increasingly compelling societal goals.4 Neverthe-
less, plaintiffs continue to fight the restrictions, and the war rages on.
While the statutory regulation of punitive damages has had some-
what limited exposure in courts, commentators have identified it as
fertile ground for the next constitutional challenges to punitive dam-
ages.5 Most articles and case law have focused primarily on whether
state procedures to determine punitive damages awards violate defen-
dants' rights, or whether statutory caps on non-economic damages
violate plaintiffs' federal and state constitutional rights.6 A secondary,
Punitive Damages Since Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 16 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
693, 697 (1993) (declaring that jury awards are increasing at rate where corporate
America will not be able to compete in today's marketplace). See infra notes 27-36 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the evolution of the tort reform movement.
2. See infra notes 9-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of plaintiffs'
constitutional challenges to statutory restrictions; see also infra app. A for a listing of
those cases.
3. See, e.g., Wackenhut Applied Technologies Ctr., Inc. v. Sygnetron Protection
Sys., Inc., 979 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding statute constitutional); Gordon v.
State, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam) (same), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1647
(1993); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635 (Ga. 1993) (same); State v.
Moseley, 436 S.E.2d 632 (Ga. 1993) (all concurring) (same), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
2101 (1994); Bagley v. Shortt, 410 S.E.2d 738 (Ga. 1991) (same); Shepherd
Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue & Assocs., Inc., 473 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa
1991) (same); Smith v. Printup, 866 P.2d 985 (Kan. 1993) (same). See infra notes 83-
109 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases. Only a handful of courts has
found a statute unconstitutional, and these decisions are of questionable validity. See
infra notes 110-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases and their
uncertain precedential value.
4. See infra notes 209-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of this trend.
5. Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science:
Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91, 140 n.239 (1993); see also 1
DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.11(12) (2d ed. 1993) (noting that restrictions raise
constitutional issues, which few courts have addressed).
6. See Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2341 (1994) (stating that
due process requires post-verdict judicial review of punitive damages awards assessed
against defendant absent other procedures to ensure fairness); TXO Prod. Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2723 (1993) (finding that West Virginia's
post-verdict review and meaningful jury instructions protect due process rights of
defendants); Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18 (pronouncing that due process places limits on the
amount of punitive damages that can be awarded against defendants); see also 2 DOBBS,
supra note 5, § 8.8 (discussing constitutional questions arising under caps for personal
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somewhat hidden theme implicit in court decisions concerns whether
the limitations have impermissibly gutted the original deterrent purpose
of punitive damages.7
The net effect of state statutory restrictions on punitive damages is
that plaintiffs receive less of a punitive damages award than they
would under the common law.8 In their quest to eliminate this new
limit on their recoveries, plaintiffs have attacked the constitutionality of
these statutes on three fronts: (1) that the statutory regulation violates
their due process rights under the federal and state constitutions; (2)
that it violates their equal protection rights under these constitutions; or
(3) that it violates their right to a trial by jury under the state con-
stitution.9
injury damages); JAMES D. GHIARDI & JOHN J. KIRCHNER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW AND
PRACTICE § 3.03 (1981 & Supp. 1994) (discussing tort caps); Samuel E. Klein et al.,
Punitive Damages, in LIBEL LITIGATION 1994 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and
Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 64-3922, 1994) (discussing
constitutional challenges raised by defendant, although listing state statutory
restrictions); Nancy L. Manzer, 1986 Tort Reform Legislation: A Systematic Evaluation
of Caps on Damages and Limitations on Joint and Several Liability, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
628, 647 (1988) (statutory caps on compensatory damages indicate legislative distrust
of juries and undermine right to trial by jury); Leonard J. Nelson, Tort Reform in
Alabama: Are Damages Restrictions Unconstitutional?, 40 ALA. L. REV. 533, 552-64
(1989) (discussing constitutional challenges to Alabama's compensatory damages cap,
and predicting that post-verdict review of punitive damages will raise constitutional
challenges). Few commentators or courts have addressed whether statutory regulation of
the size of punitive damages violates the plaintiffs constitutional rights. See Amelia J.
Toy, Statutory Punitive Damage Caps and the Profit Motive: An Economic Perspective,
40 EMORY L.J. 303, 304, 312 (1991) (arguing that statutory caps may fail to make
defendants pay full social costs of their wrongful acts); E. Jeffrey Grube, Note, Punitive
Damages: A Misplaced Remedy, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 839, 845-55 (1993) (discussing the
need for statutes that require payment of punitive damages award into state fund). But see
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 5, at 140 n.239 (discussing the constitutionality of
punitive damages restrictions).
7. See infra notes 209-15 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 37-57, 65, 67, 75, 79, 94, 101, 103, 109, 119, 122, and
accompanying text for a discussion of these statutes. See also infra app. A for a
summary of the constitutional challenges raised by plaintiffs.
9. See 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 3.12 (2d ed.
1989) (due process and equal protection challenges most often arise under either the
federal or state constitution); see also Henderson v. Alabama Power Co., 627 So. 2d
878, 884 (Ala. 1993) (plaintiff arguing that the statute limiting punitive damages
awards violates the state right to a trial by jury).
A rarely made and largely unsuccessful argument also raised by plaintiffs is that these
statutes violate the separation of powers between the judiciary and the legislature. See
McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1567, 1580 (relating the plaintiff's argument that the
statutory cap contravenes separation of powers doctrine in state constitution, an
argument court does not address); Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262, 265 n.3
(Colo. 1991) (en banc) (same). Earlier case law, prior to the enactment of tort reform
statutes, examined this question and upheld the statutes as constitutional. For example,
in Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1092 n.10 (Fla. 1987), the plaintiff
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Due process challenges arise under one of two alternative grounds.
In some instances, plaintiffs argue that statutes restricting punitive
damages awards represent an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well
as the corresponding state constitutional provision.' The punitive
damages award represents a constitutional or common law property
right, and accordingly cannot be taken away absent due process of
law." Alternatively, where the parties agree that a punitive damages
award involves no constitutionally protected rights, plaintiffs argue
that the statutory restriction bears no reasonable relation to a legitimate
governmental purpose. 2 Few courts have found a state statute regu-
lating punitive damages unconstitutional on the grounds that plaintiffs
have a per se right to punitive damages awards, although a handful
have found that punitive damages awards trigger other constitutionally
protected rights.' 3 Only one court has found that a statute bears no
rational relation to the legislative purpose. 14
Equal protection claims can arise when the statute provides for a
separate treatment of one group of defendants over another. Plaintiffs
challenge these statutes under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment and the corresponding state constitutional provision
argued that sections 51 and 52 of the Florida Code, which dealt with the availability and
amount of recovery for punitive damages, violated the separation of powers provision of
Article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution. Id. at 1092 (noting that the plaintiff
also challenged other sections that did not deal with punitive damages). The Florida
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court ruling that these sections did not violate the
Florida Constitution, holding that they were part of a substantive statutory scheme and
that any procedural provisions of these statutes were tied to the definition of the
substantive rights. Id. Nevertheless, some courts implicitly rely on the separation of
powers issue, although stating a different ground for their decision. See infra notes 209-
24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the underlying separation of powers issue
in courts' decisions.
10. See infra part IV.
11. See Kirk, 818 P.2d at 267-68 (stating that private property, such as a judgment
for punitive damages, shall not be taken for public use without just compensation). In
state courts, the Fifth Amendment applies to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution. Id. at 267. A constitutionally protected right,
however, is more than a mere expectation based on an anticipated continuation of the
right: it must rest on title to the present or future enjoyment of the property. Id. at 275
(Rovira, C.J., dissenting).
12. See Wackenhut, 979 F.2d 980 (upholding Virginia statutory cap because it
rationally relates to legitimate legislative purpose). Under Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 83 (1978), economic regulation is presumed
constitutional unless it fails to bear a rational relation to the legislative purpose.
13. See infra notes 60-82, 121-44, and accompanying text for a discussion of these
cases.
14. McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1579. See infra notes 63-72 and accompanying text for
a discussion of McBride.
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on the grounds that the statutes discriminate unfairly between similarly
situated parties. 5 Although most courts acknowledge that the statute
does classify groups, they recognize that the classification bears a fair
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.'6
Plaintiffs increasingly have argued that the statutes violate their right
to a trial by jury. 17 According to this argument, the plaintiff has a
common-law right to have the jury determine the amount of punitive
damages, as the jury has traditionally fulfilled this function. 8 Until re-
cently, however, no court examining this question agreed.' 9 Instead,
courts held either that plaintiffs had no such right, or that they actually
did receive a jury trial on the amount to which they were entitled.20
The constitutional war over punitive damages is far from over.
Nonetheless, this Article contends that the current trend in both state
and federal courts is to uphold the constitutionality of the statutes-a
trend which signals judicial acceptance of the power of legislatures to
prioritize other societal interests over the traditional purposes of puni-
tive damages.2" This Article first examines these traditional and
15. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (Supp. 1994) (capping punitive damages
awards at $250,000, but not for suits alleging intent to harm or product liability).
Compare McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1569 (stating that § 51-12-5.1 violates equal
protection) with Mack Trucks, 436 S.E.2d at 639 (finding no equal protection
violation).
16. See, e.g., Mack Trucks, 436 S.E.2d at 638-39 (finding that Georgia statutory
scheme bears rational relation to legislative purpose of economic regulation).
17. See, e.g., Henderson, 627 So. 2d at 884 (plaintiff arguing state statute violates
right to trial by jury); Printup, 866 P.2d 985 (same).
18. Henderson, 627 So. 2d at 893. A related issue concerns the plaintiff's access to
courts, where the limitation on damages arguably prevents those that are seeking such
damages from relief in the court. No court, however, has agreed. For example, in
Moseley, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2),
which restricted the amount of the punitive damages award that the plaintiff would
receive, did not violate the state constitution's access to courts provision. 436 S.E.2d
at 634. It reasoned that the constitutional provision was not intended to provide an
expansive right of access to the courts, but instead, to give a party the right to choose
between self-representation and representation by an attorney. Id.
19. See Henderson, 627 So. 2d at 893 (holding that the punitive damages statutory
cap violates the plaintiff's state constitutional right to trial by jury since the jury
traditionally determined punitive damages awards at the time of adoption of the state
constitution). See infra notes 129-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of why
the Alabama court incorrectly decided Henderson.
20. See, e.g., Moseley, 436 S.E.2d at 634 (finding that the jury determined the
amount to punish defendant; plaintiffs received jury trial on amount to which they were
entitled); Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 802 (statute requiring a percentage of punitive award to
be paid to the government did not violate right to trial by jury). See infra notes 87-91
and accompanying text for a discussion of Gordon.
21. See infra part V.A.
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controversial purposes.22 It then discusses recent statutory limitations
on punitive damages which, by limiting the amount that plaintiffs can
receive, have created the battlefield for the constitutional conflict.
23
Next, this Article examines the shift from early decisions, in which the
judiciary initially rejected the legislatures' ability to regulate punitive
damages, to more recent case law where the courts have upheld the
constitutionality of these statutes.24 This Article predicts that future
courts, including the United States Supreme Court, are likely to
continue to uphold these statutes under both federal and state consti-
tutions.23 Accordingly, by deferring to the legislatures, courts will
effectively force plaintiffs into an uneasy truce, if not a full sur-
render.26
II. THE LONG-STANDING CONTROVERSY OVER
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
As many commentators and courts are fond of pointing out, punitive
damages have existed since the time of Hammurabi, and served the
purpose then, as they do today, of punishing defendants and deterring
them and others from similar behavior in the future.27 Punitive
22. See infra part Il.
23. See infra part III.
24. See infra parts IV-V.
25. See infra part VI. In addition, defendants also may have valid constitutional
challenges to these same statutes. This Article suggests, however, that they will be
unlikely to bring these challenges, as the statutes actually work in the defendants' favor.
See infra part VI.A.3.
26. See infra part VII.
27. See Pacific Mut. Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15 (1991) (stating that punitive
damages are a long-standing part of state tort law); see also id. at 25 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (noting that punitive damages are a long-standing part of Anglo-American
law); 1 DOBBS, supra note 5, § 3.11(3) (noting that deterrence has been long-recognized
as one reason for punitive awards); GHIARDI & KIRCHNER, supra note 6, §§ 4.14-4.16
(examining declared punitive damages purposes of deterrence and punishment); JACOB A.
STEIN, DAMAGES AND RECOVERY, PERSONAL INJURY AND DEATH ACTIONS § 183 (1972 &
Supp. 1990) (noting that punitive damages originated because courts refused to grant
new trials on account of excessive behavior); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 1, at 1298-99
(discussing the reluctance of nineteenth century courts to award punitive damages); id. at
1285 (explaining that punitive damages date to the time of Hammurabi); id. at 1290
(noting that punitive damages have been available in the United States since 1784).
Commentators agree on the purposes of punitive damages. See James D. Ghiardi, The
Case Against Punitive Damages, FORUM 412 (1972) (noting that most states grant
punitive damages as an "enhancement of compensatory damages because of the wanton,
reckless, malicious or oppressive" character of defendant's behavior; as a punishment to
defendant; and as both a sanction to defendants and deterrent to all); Rustad & Koenig,
supra note 1, at 1318 (stating the purposes are punishment and deterrence). However,
punitive damages can serve other purposes besides punishment and deterrence, although
these goals are the most common and fundamental. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 1,
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damages have never been popular, however, largely because they
serve no compensatory function.28 Many jurisdictions have statutorily
limited punitive damages in many causes of action.29 Nevertheless,
at 1320 (noting that the Haslip Court cited retribution as one of the purposes of punitive
damages); id. at 1321 nn.268-69 (noting that punitive damages serve as compensation
to the plaintiff); id. at 1322-23 nn.273 & 276 (noting that punitive damages serve as
encouragement for plaintiffs to bring suit); Toy, supra note 6, at 307-08 (noting that
other purposes of punitive damages include economic efficiency to ensure the
distribution of appropriate deterrents and deserts among a variety of persons); Grube,
supra note 6, at 846-47 (stating that the purpose of punitive damages is to make
defendants pay the full social cost in order to ensure that they will discontinue this
conduct).
28. Ghiardi, supra note 27, at 412. Most courts believe that damages only
compensate the plaintiff, since the public has no defensible interest in extracting a
further pound of flesh from the defendant. Id. Consequently, in most jurisdictions,
punitive damages serve no compensatory purpose, and because they are awarded in
addition to compensation,. their net effect is that of a windfall to the plaintiff. Courts
almost universally agree, noting that punitive damages are not a right and are awarded or
withheld at the discretion of the jury. See, e.g., Chadima v. National Fidelity Life Ins.
Co., 848 F. Supp. 1418, 1421 n.1 (S.D. Iowa 1994) (stating that the rationale behind
legislation requiring payment of a portion of punitive damages awards to the state is that
the plaintiff is a fortuitous beneficiary of award simply because no one else is around to
receive it). As a result, an award of punitive damages overcompensates the plaintiff for a
harm that is fully compensated by an award of actual damages. Ghiardi, supra note 27, at
412. Where the defendant acted with malice or intent, however, courts may award
punitive damages to punish that behavior and deter the defendant and others from
engaging in this behavior. Id.
29. For example, many jurisdictions forbid an award of punitive damages altogether,
see, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (Supp. 1994) (outlawing punitive damages);
others permit them only if the defendant has acted with malice or intent, see, e.g., Miller
v. Solaglas Cal., Inc., 870 P.2d 559, 568 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied, 1994
LEXIS 294 (Colo. Apr. 4, 1994) (prohibiting punitive damages except for cases of fraud,
malice, or willful or wanton conduct); still others require a higher standard of proof, see,
e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020 (1994) (prohibiting punitive damages unless supported
by clear and convincing evidence). In fact, Congress and state legislatures have limited
the recovery of punitive damages for certain causes of action. For example, in the
Warsaw Convention Treaty, Congress imposed a statutory limitation on the size of
punitive damages that may be awarded against an airline after an air crash. See 2 DOBBS,
supra note 5, § 8.8 (discussing the statutory restriction on the amount of punitive
damages under worker's compensation laws); GHIARDI & KIRCHNER, supra note 6, §§ 4.0-
4.16, tbl. 4.1 (discussing the positions of individual states); STEIN, supra note 27, § 183
(noting that punitive damages are not allowed in wrongful death cases even under those
provisions that permit "full value"); see also, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-130
(Michie 1987) (banning punitive damages against banks, savings and loans, and credit
unions unless personal injuries or property damage occurs).
Legislatures also restrict the availability of punitive damages by requiring double or
triple compensatory damages for specific causes of action, effectively limiting the
amount of punitive damages that could be recovered. 2 DOBBS, supra note 5, § 8.1(6).
This type of specific cap is outside the scope of this Article, but some of the material
within may be relevant to issues involving specific caps.
Most jurisdictions did not, and do not recognize a separate cause of action for punitive
damages, but consider them incidental to another cause of action. Arvin Maskin & Peter
412 [Vol. 26
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most commentators and courts agree that punitive damages awards are
increasing in both size and incidence, giving rise to the "tort crisis" in
the United States.30 In the late 1980s, state legislatures enacted
statutes to reduce punitive damages, resulting in smaller awards as-
sessed against defendants or awarded to plaintiffs.3'
At almost the same time that state legislatures implemented limi-
tations on the availability and amounts of punitive damages awards,
the United States Supreme Court decided Pacific Mutual Insurance Co.
v. Haslip.32 Haslip held that punitive damages awards assessed
without adequate procedural safeguards could violate the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution.33 Commentators analyzing
Antonucci, Developments in the Law of Punitive Damages, C837 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 541,
563-64 (1993) (noting that punitive damages are available in breach of contract claims
where there are elements of tort); see also Henderson, 627 So. 2d at 885-86 (reasoning
that punitive damages do not arise as a separate cause of action, but instead at the jury's
discretion). Some legislatures, courts, and commentators have stated that the punitive
damages award should be taken out of the jury's hands altogether. See KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-3702 (a) (1994) (mandating that the amount of punitive damages is to be assessed
by the judge, not a jury); Smith v. Printup, 866 P.2d 985, 998 (Kan. 1993) (changing
from jury to judge the responsibility to assess punitive damages does not affect the
common law right of the plaintiff, common law cause of action by the plaintiff, or a
remedy at common law); Quayle, supra note 1, at 564-65 (arguing that punitive damages
should be taken out of jury's hands).
30. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 62 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (asserting that punitive
awards are increasingly granted in breach of contract claims); see also I DOBBS, supra
note 5, § 3.11(1) (noting punitive damages are increasingly awarded in civil rights,
dignitary harms, and libel cases where they are traditionally regulated); Maskin &
Antonucci, supra note 29, at 563 (stating that punitive damages are available in breach
of contract claims where there are elements of tort); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 1, at
1303-05 (explaining that punitive damages, once awarded only for malice or intent, are
now available for negligence).
3 1. The tort reform movement focused on the increase in punitive damages awards and
the resulting detrimental impact on insurance rates and coverage. See I DOBBS, supra
note 5, § 3.11(1). Former-Vice-President Quayle developed a tort reform proposal to
limit, inter alia, punitive damages awards to the amount of compensatory damages
awards. See MODEL STATE PUNITIVE DAMAGES ACT (Office of Vice-President 1992)
(discussed in Rustad & Koenig, supra note 1, at 1277-84); see also David G. Owen,
Deterrence and Desert in Tort, 73 CAL. L. REV. 665, 672 n.43 (1985) (proposing caps on
punitive damages awards). Courts generally do not inform juries of limitations on
punitive damages, so that juries continue to perform their traditional function of
weighing the harm against the cost of deterrence. See Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A.
Behrens, Punitive Damages Reform-State Legislatures Can and Should Meet the
Challenge Issued by the Supreme Court of the United States in Haslip, 42 AM. U. L. REV.
1365, 1380 (1993) (noting that the court should not inform the jury of cap because the
jury might use it as a guideline, not a ceiling). In addition, few agree whether the tort
crisis actually exists. See supra note 1.
32. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
33. Id. at 18. In Haslip, the defendants argued that due process subjects punitive
awards to some kind of procedural protection. Id. at 7; see also id. at 8 n.4, 9
(examining case law and amicus briefs debating propriety of punitive damages). While
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Haslip have been quick to argue that legislatures, not courts, should
establish constitutionally acceptable punitive damages procedures.34
Following Haslip, some legislatures and courts adapted the purposes
of the statutes to also provide procedural safeguards to protect defen-
dants' new Haslip due process rights.35 The result: the apparent
subordination of the goals of deterrence and retribution to the goals of
economic regulation and fairness to the defendant.36 The next Part
describes the legislative effort to restrict punitive damages.
111. BATLE LINES DRAWN: STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS
ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS
Regardless of their ultimate purpose, state statutes regulating puni-
tive damages fall generally into two categories: (1) statutes that impose
a cap on the amount of punitive damages awarded against defen-
dants; 37 and (2) statutes that limit the amount of the award that
plaintiffs can receive.38 Legislatures have often enacted both restric-
the Court refused to adopt a mathematical bright line ratio or to provide specific
procedures that would meet due process minimums, it implied in Haslip that adequate
guidelines would include guidance to the jury from the court and post-trial procedures to
ensure the fairness of the jury award. Id. at 18-19; see id. at 19-23 (stating that Alabama
jury instructions and post-trial review by courts protect the due process rights of
defendants). Later Court decisions have confirmed Haslip. See Honda Motor Co. v.
Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2342-43 (1994) (stating that due process requires that judges
perform post-verdict review); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct.
2711, 2723 (1993) (explaining that objective criteria, including meaningful jury
instructions and post-verdict review, protect due process). See infra notes 160-68, 174,
and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
34. See, e.g., Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 31, at 1372-74 (arguing that the
legislature, not the courts, should determine the due process limits of punitive damages).
Moreover, most of the Supreme Court Justices agree that punitive damages could be
limited by statute. See infra notes 160-68, 174, and accompanying text.
35. See General Chem. Corp. v. De La Lastra, 815 S.W.2d 750, 759-60 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1991) (finding the statute enacted to reform punitive damages is a procedural
safeguard sufficient to protect the defendant's due process rights as required by Haslip),
rev'd in part on other grounds, 852 S.W.2d 916 (Tex.), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 490
(1993); see also Anthony Gnoffo, Jr., Lawmaker Singles Out State Tort System for
Reform: It Works Fine, Say Trial Lawyers, But a State Senator Wants to End What He
Calls Frivolous, Greedy Suits, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 25, 1994, at B 1, B5 (stating that
the purpose of proposed New Jersey statutory punitive damages cap is to ensure
fairness).
36. See infra notes 209-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
competing goals.
37. See infra notes 41-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of these statutes;
see also infra apps. A and B for a listing of the statutes and the constitutional challenges
made against them.
38. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of these statutes;
see also infra apps. A and B for a listing of the statutes and the constitutional challenges
made against them.
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tions together, so that a state may have a flat cap on punitive damages
at a certain dollar amount, and also divert a certain percentage of that
award into a state fund.39 Some statutes have distinguished between
certain groups of defendants, imposing these restrictions on some
groups, but not on others. 40
A. Restrictions on Awards Against Defendants
Restrictions on awards against defendants either place an absolute
cap on the amount of punitive damages awards or require the award to
stand in some fixed ratio to actual damages. Seven states have flat
statutory caps limiting any punitive damages award to a specific
amount. 4' Alabama provides a typical example, where the state
legislature has limited awards of punitive damages to $250,000.42 In
most jurisdictions, the statute provides exceptions to the mandatory
cap, most often When the defendant acts with actual malice or intent to
harm.43 Virginia is the only state which applies the statutory cap to all
causes of action without exception. 44
39. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (Supp. 1994) (capping punitive damages
awards for actions not alleging product liability or intent to harm at $250,000 and
requiring 75% of product liability punitive damages awards to be paid into a state fund).
40. See Klein et al., supra note 6, at H(l) (listing various types of statutory
restrictions by state); see also infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (1993) (implementing $250,000 cap on punitive
damages, with certain enumerated exceptions); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 ($250,000
cap); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702(e) (capping punitive damages awards at the lesser of
$5 million or the highest annual gross income earned by the defendant over the past five
years, with exceptions assessed by the judge); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.005 (Michie
Supp. 1993) ($300,000 cap when actual damages are less than $100,000); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-03.2-11(4) (Supp. 1993) (twice the compensatory damages or $250,000,
whichever is greater); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 41.007, .008 (West Supp.
1995) (four times the actual damages or $200,000, whichever is greater, with exceptions
for damages arising from intentional torts); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Michie 1992)
(capping all punitive damages at $350,000 without exception). Montana once had a
statutory cap at one percent of the defendant's net worth, but this has been repealed. See
Owen, supra note 31, at 672 n.43 (discussing Montana's punitive damages statute
limiting the award to $25,000 or one percent of defendant's net worth); see also MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(6)(b) (1985) (prescribing cap at $25,000 or one percent of the
defendant's net worth, whichever is greater), amended by MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-
221(6)-(7) (1987) (prescribing the procedure which trier of fact must use to determine
punitive damages award, omitting mention of a cap). Plaintiffs have attacked this type
of statute on four occasions: unsuccessfully three times, and successfully once. See
infra notes 105-09, 121-44, and accompanying text.
42. ALA. CODE § 6-11-21.
43. See, e.g., id.
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld
the constitutionality of this statute in Wackenhut Applied Technologies Ctr., Inc. v.
Sygnetron Protection Sys., Inc., 979 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1992). See infra notes 108-09
and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
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The second category of statutory caps requires that the award be no
more than a fixed percentage of actual damages, codifying a prevalent
common law rule.4' Four states have passed such legislation, gen-
erally requiring that the award be no more than actual damages, or two
times the amount of actual damages.46 These statutes generally have
no exceptions and are accordingly more rigid.47
Legislatures have enacted both types of statutory caps as economic
regulation, usually as a part of the tort reforms of the 1980s.48 For ex-
ample, many legislatures enacted the caps to strike a balance between
the societal benefits of punishment or deterrence and the resultant costs
imposed on a state's economy. 49 In addition, some courts have ex-
panded the original legislative purpose of the caps to now include the
45. Although common-law limitations on punitive damages awards are outside the
scope of this Article, many jurisdictions already require punitive damages to bear some
relationship to actual damages under the common law, although few have defined that
relationship. See, e.g., 30 OHIO JURISPRUDENCE 3d Damages § 161 n.66 (1981 & Supp.
1994); see also Pacific Mut. Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991) (stating that
punitive damages that bear some relation to compensatory damages could be
constitutional); Maskin & Antonucci, supra note 29, at 575 (stating that punitive
damages must bear a reasonable relation to actual damages). Not all agree, however, that
punitive damages need bear any relationship to actual damages. See, e.g., Aldrich v.
Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., 756 F.2d 243, 249 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that punitive
damages need bear no exact relationship to compensatory damages); Kirkbride v. Lisbon
Contractors, 555 A.2d 800, 803 (Pa. 1989) (holding that Pennsylvania law expressly
forbids that punitive damages stand in relation to compensatory damages); see also
Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 741 (3d Cir. 1991) (declining to
resolve the "thorny issue" presented by the conflict between Kirkbride, which refused to
require a proportion between actual and punitive damages, and the Supreme Court's
decision in Haslip, which suggested that due process requires such proportion).
46. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102 (West 1989) (limiting the award to
actual damages with exceptions, and plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with
malice); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West 1991) (limiting the award to twice
actual damages in product liability suits); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73 (West Supp. 1995)
(limiting the award to three times compensatory damages with exceptions); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23, § 9 (West 1987) (requiring the plaintiff to prove oppression, fraud, or
malice before receiving punitive damages and limiting the award to amount of
compensatory damages with exceptions). No plaintiff has challenged this type of
statute.
47. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 1, at 1281 n.67 (noting that statutes requiring
that punitive awards stand in some fixed ratio to the actual damages are much stricter
than those with a flat cap and exceptions).
48. See, e.g., Wackenhut, 979 F.2d at 984-85 (stating that the statute is economic
regulation); see also Henderson v. Alabama Power Co., 627 So. 2d 878, 880 (Ala. 1993)
(relating that the statutory restrictions are part of the 1987 tort reform package); Robert
D. Hunter, Alabama's Tort Reform Legislation, 18 CUMB. L. REV. 281 (1988) (giving
the history of tort reform legislation).
49. See Wackenhut, 979 F.2d at 985 (noting that the purpose of VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-38.1 is to eliminate jury discretion by determining appropriate balance between
the deterrence of defendants and the burden on the state economy).
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goal of reasonableness, a procedural requirement under Haslip.0
B. Restrictions on Awards Received by Plaintiffs
One of the most litigated statutory restrictions on punitive damages
awards limits the amount of punitive damages awards that plaintiffs
may receive. Nine states have enacted this type of statute, which
generally redirects a certain percentage of the punitive damages award
into a state fund."' For example, Florida claims thirty-five percent of a
punitive damages award for its general state funds; Iowa, seventy-five
percent.52 Numerous state legislative bills also have proposed similar
legislation.53 Moreover, many legal groups, including the American
50. See General Chem. Corp., 815 S.W.2d at 759-60 (holding that the statute enacted
to reform punitive damages is a procedural safeguard sufficient to protect the defendant's
due process rights as required by Haslip); Gnoffo, supra note 35, at B 1, B6 (stating the
proposed bill to limit punitive damages awards at five times actual damages is intended
to keep punitive awards "reasonable"). After Haslip, "general concerns of
reasonableness ... properly enter into the constitutional calculus." Haslip, 499 U.S. at
18. Legislatures may also regulate punitive damages in order to protect corporate
existence and competitiveness. See Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080,
1086 (Fla. 1987) (stating that the purpose of such legislation is to protect corporations
from going out of business as a result of enormous punitive damages awards that
insurance companies will not insure); Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 510
N.W.2d 854, 867-68 (Iowa 1994) (stating that the purpose of the caps is to protect
corporate existence, discussing an asbestos suit and noting that corporations suffering
undue punitive damages overkill may raise that as a factor in limiting punitive damages).
51. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102(4) (placing one-third of punitive
damages awards into state fund); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2)(b) (placing 35% of
punitive damages awards into state funds); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (placing
75% of punitive damages awards for product liability into state treasury); ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. ch. 735, § 5/2-1207 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994) (giving the trial court
discretion to apportion the award to the Department of Rehabilitation); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 668A.1(2)(b) (West 1987) (placing 75% of the punitive damages awards into a civil
fund when the defendant's actions are not specifically directed at the plaintiff); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 537.675(2) (Vernon 1988) (granting 50% of punitive damages awards to the
Tort Victims' Compensation Fund); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 8701 (McKinney Supp.
1995) (expired on April 1, 1994) (making 20% of punitive damages awards payable to
the state); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540(1)(c3 (Supp. 1994) (making 50% of punitive
damages awards payable to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Account, after attorney
fees); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (1992) (placing 50% of punitive damages in excess
of $20,000 payable to the General Fund). Plaintiffs' first two challenges against these
statutes proved successful; the remainder have failed. See infra notes 60-109 and
accompanying text; see also infra apps. A and B.
52. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2)(b); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.l(2)(b). This type of
statute raises legislative drafting concerns, including whether the state must be a party
to the litigation, or whether the state has an interest in the action. See GHIARDI &
KIRCHNER, supra note 6, § 21.16, which discusses these and other drafting concerns.
53. See, e.g., Ariz. H.B. 2570, 41st Legis. (1994) (proposing that punitive damages
in excess of actual damages would be paid into a victim assistance fund); Minn. S. 989,
78th Legis. (1993) (proposing depositing a portion of medical malpractice punitive
damages into a state fund). But see Cal. A.B. 147, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (1994)
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Bar Association, support this type of statute.5 4
The purpose of these statutes differs from the purpose of those that
restrict the amount of punitive damages awards assessed against defen-
dants. In many jurisdictions, since the plaintiff is the fortuitous
beneficiary of the punitive award, the legislature intended to divert part
of the award to a public benefit 55 Other legislatures have targeted
certain behaviors and restrict plaintiffs' recovery of punitive damages
awarded against defendants for this behavior. For example, the Geor-
gia punitive damages cap diverts seventy-five percent of punitive
damages awards in product liability actions into a civil fund, because
the risk of the defendant's actions in these cases falls not only on the
plaintiff, but equally on society at large.56 Still other legislatures have
intended to decrease litigation by inhibiting the plaintiff's incentive to
sue, or by depriving the plaintiff of the financial ability to sue.57
(proposing that 90% of punitive damages awarded to plaintiffs in certain actions be paid
into a Victim-Witness Assistance Fund) (defeated due to constitutional provisions).
54. See Grube, supra note 6, at 861-63. Grube discusses this type of statute at length,
arguing that courts should find it constitutional. Id. at 867-74.
55. Chadima v. National Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 848 F. Supp. 1418, 1421 n.1 (S.D.
Iowa 1994) (citing Spaur, 510 N.W.2d at 869 and Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice
Petrides-Donohue & Assocs., Inc., 473 N.W.2d 612, 619 (Iowa 1991)). Chadima held
that a punitive damages award could be regulated by the state. Id. at 1421. The court
reasoned that plaintiffs were the fortuitous beneficiaries of a windfall for deterrence that
benefited society because they traditionally received the award simply because there was
no one else to receive it. Id. at 1421 n.1. The statute advanced the legislature's goal to
ensure that society would benefit from that award, and § 668A. 1 of the Iowa Code was
designed to divert a portion of the resulting punitive damages award to a public purpose.
Id.; see also Owen, supra note 31, at 666-67 (stating that the awards can be put to public
purpose); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 1, at 1323 n.275 (stating that the public benefit
justifies fee shifting by redirecting portion of the award to the state); Grube, supra note
6, at 842-54 (stating that the plaintiff has no right to punitive damages, which can be
put to better use). In fact, some legislatures view the payment of a portion of the award
to the plaintiff as sufficient to reward the "public-spirited plaintiff." See Tideway Oil
Programs, Inc. v. Serio, 431 So. 2d 454, 460 & n.1 (Miss. 1983) ("The policy
underlying our rule on award of punitive damages obviously contemplates rewarding
public spirited plaintiffs who will endure the slings and arrows of litigation to bring a
wrongdoer to account."). But see 2 DOBBS, supra note 5, § 8.1(6) (stating that the caps
may seriously undermine a plaintiff's ability to sue, and yet may leave the defendant
sufficient profit to continue the harmful activity). See infra notes 212-26 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the impact of these statutes on the purposes of
punitive damages.
56. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635,
638 (Ga. 1993).
57. 1 DOBBS, supra note 5, § 3.11(12) (discussing, in part, the de facto caps resulting
from distributing a portion to a state fund). Compare Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800,
802 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam) (stating that the deterrence of plaintiffs bringing punitive
damages claims is a legitimate goal) with McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F.
Supp. 1563, 1570 (M.D. Ga. 1990) (reaching the opposite conclusion).
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Constitutional challenges to statutory restrictions on punitive dam-
ages essentially did not exist before 1987, although legislatures had
often limited punitive damages awards in some way." With the enact-
ment of state tort reform statutes, however, constitutional challenges
against limits on punitive damages increased. 59 As the following
sections indicate, however, while early courts held that these statutes
violated the federal or state constitutions, later courts have almost
uniformly disagreed.
IV. THE INITIAL ATTACK: PUNITIVE DAMAGES
RESTRICTIONS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Although initial forays by plaintiffs into the constitutional arena
against statutory restrictions proved successful, later decisions indi-
cated that these early victories would be short-lived.6° Plaintiffs in
these earlier cases, as in later ones, raised constitutional due process
and equal protection challenges. 6' The first two of these cases arose
under statutes that claimed a percentage of punitive damages awards
for a state fund; both courts held these statutes unconstitutional.62
The first court, in McBride v. General Motors Corp.,63 held not
only that the plaintiff had a constitutional right to the award, but also
that the effect of the statute bore no rational relation to its purpose.64
In McBride, the plaintiffs argued that the Georgia statutory scheme
violated their due process and equal protection rights under the state
and federal constitutions.65 The United States District Court for the
58. See McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1564-65, 1566 (noting that the challenge to
punitive damages restrictions in the Georgia Tort Reform Act was a matter of first
impression, and the first and only such challenge then pending before any state or
federal court). See supra note 29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the statutes
enacted prior to the tort reforms of the late 1980s, which effectively capped the amount
of punitive damages awards that could be assessed against defendants.
59. Plaintiffs brought at least 10 challenges against punitive damages restrictions.
See infra notes 63-144 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
60. See infra notes 83-109, 200-05, and accompanying text for a discussion of later
cases that rejected the plaintiffs' challenges.
61. See supra notes 9-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the constitutional
challenges raised by plaintiffs.
62. For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 63-82 and accompanying text.
63. 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990) (opinion and declaratory judgment).
64. Id. at 1579.
65. Id. at 1566-67. The plaintiffs successfully raised other constitutional challenges
as well: that the statute violated the Georgia constitutional provision requiring that the
title of the statute adequately describe the contents of the statute, id. at 1578, 1579
(citing GA. CONST. art. 3, § 5, para. 3); that subsection (e)(1) of § 51-12-5.1,
concerning the limitation of one award per defendant action, violated equal protection
and due process, id. at 1579; that § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) violated the Double Jeopardy Clause
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Middle District of Georgia agreed and issued a declaratory judgment.66
Section 51-12-5.1(e)(2) of the Georgia Code diverted seventy-five
percent of each punitive damages award for product liability claims
into a state fund, and also limited punitive damages awards in non-
product liability cases to $250,000.67 The McBride court applied
Georgia law on compensatory damages to establish that a plaintiff had
a property right in punitive damages.68 Accordingly, the court held
that the legislature could not interfere with the punitive award, since,
as compensation, it represented a property right protected by the due
process clauses of both constitutions.
of the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, id.; and that the statute violated the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, id. While
the questions of double jeopardy and excessive fines concern the defendants' rights,
rather than the plaintiffs' rights, state statutes requiring payment to a state fund may
well resurrect these claims on behalf of a defendant. See infra notes 184-94 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the implications of these statutes on the
prohibitions against double jeopardy and excessive fines under the Federal Constitution.
66. McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1569. The McBride court examined, and found
unconstitutional, the same statutory provision that the Supreme Court of Georgia later
upheld in Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635 (Ga. 1993); State v. Moseley,
436 S.E.2d 632 (Ga. 1993) (all concurring); and Bagley v. Shortt, 410 S.E.2d 738 (Ga.
1991). See infra notes 95-110 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
67. McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1565. See also GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2),
which reads in pertinent part:
(2) Seventy-five percent of any amounts awarded under this subsection as
punitive damages, less a proportionate part of the costs of litigation,
including reasonable attorney's fees, all as determined by the trial judge, shall
be paid into the treasury of the state through the Office of Treasury and Fiscal
Services. Upon issuance of judgment in such a case, the state shall have all
rights due a judgment creditor until such judgment is satisfied and shall stand
on equal footing with the plaintiff of the original case in securing a recovery
after payment to the plaintiff of damages awarded other than as punitive
damages. A judgment debtor may remit the state's proportional share of
punitive damages to the clerk of the court in which the judgment was rendered.
It shall be the duty of the clerk to pay over such amounts to the Office of
Treasury and Fiscal Services within 60 days of receipt from the judgment
debtor. This paragraph shall not be construed as making the state a party at
interest and the sole right of the state is to the proceeds as provided in this
paragraph.
Id. Because the plaintiffs in McBride brought suit against the automobile manufacturer
for injuries and deaths sustained as a result of defective rear-seat lap belts in General
Motors' automobiles, the action was a product liability action and governed by § 51-12-
5.1(e)(l) & (2). McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1565-66.
68. See McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1572-73 (citing Shessel v. Stroup, 316 S.E.2d 155
(Ga. 1984), and Jones v. Jones, 376 S.E.2d 674 (Ga. 1989), for the proposition that a
plaintiff has a vested property right in damages). Neither Shessel nor Jones addressed
this issue: Shessel held unconstitutional a statute of limitations for a medical
malpractice cause of action, and Jones held unconstitutional an interspousal immunity
doctrine on equal protection grounds. See id.
69. Id.
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Moreover, according to the McBride court, the purposes of con-
taining liability insurance, creating revenue, or protecting business did
not rationally relate to the statute's focus on product liability.70
Instead, the court found that the legislation discouraged plaintiffs from
suing corporations, in the court's eyes an illegitimate goal.7' The court
held that the statute failed on equal protection grounds as well, because
the statute arbitrarily discriminated between plaintiffs seeking punitive
damages under product liability causes of action, who could retain
only twenty-five percent of a punitive damages award, and other plain-
tiffs with no similar restriction.72
The only state court decision to find unconstitutional a statute
requiring payment of a portion of a punitive damages award to a state
fund occurred in 1991, subsequent to McBride. The Colorado
Supreme Court, in Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co. ,73 held that because
punitive damages served a compensatory function, they vested entirely
in the plaintiff upon entry of judgment, and could not be subsequently
regulated by the legislature. 74 Section 13-21-102(4) of the Colorado
Code redirected one-third of any exemplary damages award into a state
general fund, expressly disavowing any state interest in the award
prior to judgment.75 According to the court, the statute represented a
70. Id. at 1569-70.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1565, 1569. The court held that the provision requiring a percentage to be
paid to the state arbitrarily discriminated between parties, thereby violating Article III,
section V, paragraph III of the Georgia Constitution. Id. at 1569. The court also stated
that the provision violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution, yet
provided no additional reasoning. Id. at 1579.
73. 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991) (en banc).
74. Id. at 265. The jury awarded Kirk $288,000 in aggregate compensatory damages
and exemplary damages of $160,500 under his claim for malicious prosecution, which
the court apportioned according to the Colorado statute. Id. at 262, 264. Plaintiff Kirk
raised other constitutional challenges that the court did not reach, alleging that the
statute: (a) violated procedural and substantive due process of law and equal protection of
the law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
and Article II, section 25 of the Colorado Constitution; (b) impaired the obligation of
Kirk's contingency fee contract with his attorney and violated the constitutional
proscription against the impairment of contracts under Article I, Section 10 of the
United States Constitution and Article II, section 11 of the Colorado Constitution; and
(c) contravened the separation of powers doctrine set forth in Article III of the Colorado
Constitution. Id. at 265 n.3. In addition, because some of the plaintiffs claims arose
after the effective date of § 13-21-102(1)(a) and § 13-21-102(3), which provided that the
amount of exemplary damages could not exceed the amount of actual damages except
under exceptional circumstances, the court held that part of the statute did not apply. Id.
at 264 n.2.
75. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102(4). This statute reads in pertinent part:
One-third of all reasonable damages collected pursuant to this section shall be
paid into the state general fund. The remaining two-thirds of such damages
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taking of the plaintiffs' property without just compensation, a violation
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and Article II, section 15 of the Colorado Constitution.76
Although the court recognized that Colorado permitted punitive
damages only by statute, and only to punish malicious or wanton
behavior,77 the court explained that punitive damages awards also
compensate plaintiffs for the time, effort, and expense of obtaining and
actually collecting the judgment. 78 Because the statute asserted no
interest in the award prior to judgment, the state could not claim that
only two-thirds of the judgment actually vested in the plaintiff.79
Instead, the entire award became the plaintiffs property at judgment,
protected by the due process clauses of both constitutions.80
No court subsequent to Kirk and McBride has held any statute
regulating punitive damages unconstitutional on due process or equal
protection grounds. Later Georgia case law explicitly rejected the
federal district court's decision in McBride.8' Other courts have re-
fused to apply the reasoning in Kirk, despite the similarity in the
statutes requiring payment to state funds.8 2 The following Part ex-
plores the growing number of courts that reject the reasoning in Kirk
and McBride, and examines their reasoning.
collected shall be paid to the injured party. Nothing in this subsection (4)
shall be construed to give the general fund any interest in the claim for
exemplary damages or in the litigation itself at any time prior to payment
becoming due.
Id.
76. Kirk, 818 P.2d at 263-64, 273.
77. Id. at 265-66 & n.4. Similarly, compensatory awards "perform[] the secondary
function of discouraging 'a repetition of [the defendant's] wrongful conduct."' Id. at 265
(citation omitted).
78. Id. at 265-67. See also supra note 75 for the Colorado statutory provision
allocating the amount of punitive damages to the injured party.
79. Kirk, 818 P.2d at 266-67, 272. The court stated that "'[it is not within the power
of a legislature to take away rights which have been once vested by a judgment.
Legislation may act on subsequent proceedings ... but when those actions have passed
into judgment the power of the legislature to disturb the rights created thereby ceases."'
Id. at 268 (citation omitted) (quoting McCollough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102 (1898)).
The court drew a parallel to a United States Supreme Court decision from 1898, which
held that a judgment validating certain coupon bonds held by the plaintiff could not be
invalidated because the statute giving rise to that award was later repealed. Kirk, 818
P.2d at 268 & n.7 (discussing McCollough, 172 U.S. 102). Although that decision
involved the retroactivity of a statute's effect, and not the question of the state's power
to regulate an award of punitive damages, the Kirk court found the early decision
controlling. Id. at 267-68 & n.7.
80. Id. at 273.
81. See infra notes 87-110 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
82. See infra notes 104, 111, 117-20, and accompanying text.
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V. THE TIDE TURNS: PUNITIVE DAMAGES RESTRICTIONS
ARE CONSTITUTIONAL
After Kirk and McBride, the judiciary began to defer to the
legislative will, and at least seven subsequent courts upheld the consti-
tutionality of statutory restrictions.8 3 Although the threshold issue
concerned whether the plaintiff had a vested or constitutional right to
receive punitive damages, post-McBride and Kirk courts agreed that
no such right existed.84 Instead, courts more carefully examined the
legitimacy of the purposes of the legislation or the procedure by which
the legislature restricted the award.85
A. Plaintiffs Forced to Yield Ground
As in Kirk and McBride, most of the challenges during this time
focused on statutes that diverted a percentage of the punitive damages
award to the state.86 Typical of the case law which decided that the
plaintiff had no cognizable right to punitive damages was the 1992
decision by the Supreme Court of Florida, Gordon v. State.87 In
Gordon, the court held that section 768.73(2)(b) of the Florida Code,
which provided that the state had an interest in sixty percent of the
punitive damages awards in personal injury or wrongful death causes
of action, did not violate the plaintiff's due process rights.8 The court
83. See Wackenhut Applied Technologies Ctr., Inc. v. Sygnetron Protection Sys.,
Inc., 979 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding the Virginia statute constitutional); Gordon
v. State, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1647 (1993)
(finding the Florida statute constitutional); Mack Trucks, 436 S.E.2d 635 (finding the
Georgia statute constitutional); Moseley, 436 S.E.2d 632 (finding the Georgia statute
constitutional under the Takings Clause, the fight to jury trial, and the right of access to
the courts); Bagley, 410 S.E.2d 738 (finding the Georgia statute constitutional);
Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Petrides-Donohue Assocs., Inc., 473 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa
1991) (finding the Iowa statute constitutional); Smith v. Printup, 866 P.2d 985 (Kan.
1993) (finding the Kansas statute constitutional). But see infra notes 121-42 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Henderson v. Alabama Power Co., 627 So. 2d 878
(Ala. 1993), the only case after Kirk and McBride to find a statute regulating punitive
damages unconstitutional.
84. See infra notes 87-110 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Wackenhut, 979 F.2d at 985 (stating the parties stipulated that the
statute is economic regulation); Mack Trucks, 436 S.E.2d at 638 (determining that
receipt of punitive damages is not a right of plaintiff). See infra part VI.A.2 for a
discussion of rational relation analysis.
86. See infra app. A for a summary of these cases.
87. 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1647 (1993).
88. Id. at 801. In Gordon, a K-Mart employee falsely imprisoned and battered the
plaintiff; the plaintiff received a jury verdict against K-Mart for $72,500 in
compensatory damages and $512,600 in punitive damages. Id. The court affirmed the
awards. Id. The Florida Supreme Court quoted FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2)(b) (Supp.
1986), which read:
424 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 26
drew a distinction between compensatory and punitive damages,
noting that while plaintiffs have a constitutional right to compensatory
damages, they have no cognizable, protected right to punitive dam-
ages.81 Absent that right, a plaintiff could not assert a property interest
in punitive damages until after a judgment was rendered, and the
legislature could regulate or place conditions on the recovery. 90
Because the statute bore a rational relation to the legislative purpose of
allotting to "the public weal a portion of damages designed to deter
future harm to the public and to discourage punitive damage claims by
making them less remunerative to the claimant and the claimant's
attorney," the court found it constitutional.9'
Other courts agreed with Gordon. For example, the Supreme Court
of Iowa held, in Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-
Donohue & Associates,92 that the distribution of seventy-five percent
of a punitive damages award into a civil reparation fund pursuant to
section 668A. 1 (2)(b) of the Iowa Code did not amount to an unfair
taking under either the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution or the Iowa Constitution.93 Like Gordon, the Shepherd
Components court held that the plaintiff had no right to punitive
damages until entry of the judgment. 94 Furthermore, in Mack Trucks,
If the cause of action was based on personal injury or wrongful death, 60
percent of the [punitive damages] award shall be payable to the Public Medical
Assistance Trust Fund . . .; otherwise 60 percent of the award shall be payable
to the General Revenue Fund.
Id. (amended 1994). This statute was enacted as part of the Tort Reform and Insurance
Act of 1986. Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 801. The statute was subsequently amended to
permit the state to divert 35% of the award into state funds. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.73(2)(b).
89. Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 801-02.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 802.
92. 473 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1991).
93. Id. at 619.
94. Id.; see also IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.l(2)(a) & (b), which reads in pertinent part:
a. If the answer or finding pursuant to subsection 1, paragraph "b", is
affirmative [that the act was directed.at the plaintiff], the full amount of the
punitive or exemplary damages awarded shall be paid to the claimant.
b. If the answer or finding pursuant to subsection 1, paragraph "b", is
negative [that the act was not directed specifically at the plaintiff], after
payment of all applicable costs and fees, an amount not to exceed twenty-five
percent of the punitive or exemplary damages awarded may be ordered paid to
the claimant, with the remainder of the award to be ordered paid into a civil
reparations trust fund administered by the state court administrator. Funds
placed in the civil reparations trust shall be under the control and supervision
of the executive council, and shall be disbursed only for purposes of indigent
civil litigation programs or insurance assistance programs.
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Inc. v. Conkle" and State v. Moseley,96 the Supreme Court of
Georgia held constitutional the similar section 51-12-5.1 of the
Georgia Code. 9' The court stated that plaintiffs had no vested right in
the award, and whether or not they received the full award was insig-
nificant. 98 As in Gordon, the real question concerned whether the
statute bore a rational relation to its purpose.99 Since the clearly stated
purpose of the statute was to punish and deter the defendant, and not
to provide compensation or a windfall to an individual plaintiff, the
legislation bore a reasonable relation to its legitimate purpose, and the
court upheld it as constitutional.'o
Challenges that claimed the statutes violated plaintiffs' equal pro-
tection and trial by jury rights fared no better. For example, although
the Georgia Supreme Court in Mack Trucks agreed with the plaintiff
that a statutory classification had indeed occurred under section 51-12-
5.1 of the Georgia Code, it held the statute constitutional, stating that
the statute treated all similarly situated parties equally.'0 ' That same
Id. In Shepherd Components, the trial court entered a judgment against one of two co-
defendants for $26,000 in punitive damages, and allocated 75% of that award to the civil
reparation trust fund pursuant to § 668A.l(2)(b). Shepherd Components, 473 N.W.2d at
618. The court stated that the statute did not violate the plaintiff's due process rights,
for the plaintiff had no vested right in a particular measure of damages or to any portion
of the damages prior to the entry of a judgment. Id. at 619 (citing American Bank &
Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 683 P.2d 670, 676 (Cal. 1984); Meech v. Hillhaven
West, Inc., 776 P.2d 488, 504 (Mont. 1989); Vaughan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 708
S.W.2d 656, 660-61 (Mo. 1986)); see also Spaur v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp.,
510 N.W.2d 854, 868 (Iowa 1994) (affirming Shepherd Components' reasoning).
95. 436 S.E.2d 635 (Ga. 1993).
96. 436 S.E.2d 632 (Ga. 1993) (all concurring), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2101 (1994).
97. Mack Trucks, 436 S.E.2d at 637-39; Moseley, 436 S.E.2d at 634. Prior to these
decisions, the federal district court in McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp.
1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990), held this section unconstitutional. See supra notes 63-72 and
accompanying text for a discussion of McBride.
98. Mack Trucks, 436 S.E.2d at 638-39.
99. See, e.g., id. at 638-39 (holding the statute bore a reasonable relation to its
purpose). Like the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Gordon, the Mack Trucks
court reasoned that the plaintiff had no vested property right in the amount of punitive
damages, and as a result, the legislature could lawfully limit the amount of punitive
damages awarded. Id. Moreover, the Mack Trucks court stated that because the plaintiff
had no right to punitive damages, the statute need pass only the rational relation test and
rest "'upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object
of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."'
Id. at 638 (quoting Allrid v. Emory Univ., 285 N.E.2d 521 (Ga. 1982)).
100. Id. at 639.
101. Id. at 639. Under § 51-12-5.1, the state would receive 75% of punitive damages
awards assessed against product liability defendants. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1.
See supra note 67 for the text of § 51-12-5.1 (e)(2). The Mack Trucks court reasoned that
the risk of the defendants' actions fell not only on the plaintiff, but on society at large,
and by placing the restriction on product liability defendants, the legislature distributed
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day, in Moseley, the court again upheld the constitutionality of section
51-12-5.1, this time holding that it did not violate the plaintiffs' right
to a trial by jury. 10 2 According to the Moseley court, the jury deter-
mined the amount it believed would punish the defendant, and the
statute entitled the plaintiffs to twenty-five percent of that award; thus,
the plaintiffs received a jury trial on the amount to which they were
entitled.'0 3 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Florida in Gordon sum-
marily disposed of the plaintiff's claim that the restriction on his receipt
of the award violated his constitutional right to a trial by jury, finding it
sufficient to say that the statute was constitutional.' °4
Attacks on statutory caps, although relatively rare, also faced defeat.
The Supreme Court of Georgia initially held, in Bagley v. Shortt,105
that the plaintiff did not have a right to receive punitive damages, and
that if the legislature could constitutionally eliminate punitive damages,
it could constitutionally limit them as well. 10 6 Two years later, in
Mack Trucks, the Georgia Supreme Court confirmed Bagley in dicta,
adding that public policy reasons dictated that a cap be placed on
punitive damages. 0 7 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals implicitly
agreed with Bagley in its 1992 decision, Wackenhut Applied Tech-
the punitive damages to all citizens of the state because they were all at equal risk. Mack
Trucks, 436 S.E.2d at 638; see also Shepherd Components, 473 N.W.2d at 619 (holding
that the Iowa statute did not violate equal protection).
102. Moseley, 436 S.E.2d at 634.
103. Id. Furthermore, even if the plaintiff had a common-law right to have a jury
determine the size of the punitive damages award, the General Assembly could abrogate
that right. Id. (citing Teasley v. Mathis, 255 S.E.2d 57 (Ga. 1979)). The plaintiff also
argued that § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) interfered with the right to access to the court under the
Georgia Constitution, but the Moseley court again disagreed, holding that the
constitutional provision was not created to provide an expansive right of access to the
courts, but only to provide a "'right of choice' (between self-representation and
representation by counsel.)." Id. (quoting Nelms v. Georgian Manor Ass'n, 321 S.E.2d
330, 333 (Ga. 1984)).
104. Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 802. The dissent in Gordon argued that the payment to a
state fund would violate the plaintiffs right to a trial by jury granted by the Florida
Constitution. See id. at 804 (Shaw, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). At least
one court has held that the plaintiff does not even have a right to have a jury consider the
question of punitive damages at all. See infra notes 200-05 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Printup, 866 P.2d 985.
105. 410 S.E.2d 738 (Ga. 1991).
106. Id. at 739 (citing Teasley, 255 S.E.2d 57, which held that the elimination of
exemplary damages under no-fault insurance law did not violate the plaintiffs rights to
due process, equal protection, and access to the courts). Accordingly, § 51-12-5.1(g) of
the Georgia Code, which capped punitive damages at $250,000 against defendants who
were not defending a product liability action, did not violate the plaintiffs' equal
protection rights. See id. at 739.
107. Mack Trucks, 436 S.E.2d at 639.
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nologies Center, Inc. v. Sygnetron Protection Systems, Inc.,' °0 in
which it upheld the constitutionality of Virginia's statutory punitive
damages cap."
B. Kirk and McBride Fall by the Wayside
The numerous decisions subsequent to McBride and Kirk under-
mine the precedential value of these early decisions. For example, in
Bagley, Mack Trucks, and Moseley, the Supreme Court of Georgia
completely rejected the district court's reasoning in McBride, finding
the Georgia punitive damages cap constitutional in each case." 0 Kirk,
108. 979 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1992).
109. Id. at 985. The Wackenhut court held that § 8.01-38-1 of the Virginia Code,
which placed an absolute $350,000 cap on the amount of punitive damages that could be
awarded against a defendant, did not violate the due process guarantees of the Virginia
and United States Constitutions. Id. Instead, the punitive damages cap limited the jury's
discretion, thus effectuating the legislature's purpose of ensuring that punitive damages
awards struck a balance between punishing and deterring defendants and preventing
awards that would burden the state's economy. Id. Since the parties stipulated that the
legislature enacted the statutory cap as an economic regulation, the court examined it
under the rational relation test, and the issue of a plaintiff's right to punitive damages
never arose. Id. The court additionally noted that other courts have routinely rejected
substantive due process challenges to statutory caps regulating non-economic or
punitive damages awards. Id. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1, which reads in pertinent
part:
In any action accruing on or after July 1, 1988, including an action for medical
malpractice under Chapter 21.1 (§ 8.01-581.1 et seq.), the total amount
awarded for punitive damages against all defendants found to be liable shall be
determined by the trier of fact. In no event shall the total amount awarded for
punitive damages exceed $350,000. The jury shall not be advised of the
limitation prescribed by this section. However, if a jury returns a verdict for
punitive damages in excess of the maximum amount specified in this section,
the judge shall reduce the award and enter judgment for such damages in the
maximum amount provided by this section.
Id.
One of the issues in Wackenhut concerned whether the statute applied to unintentional
as well as intentional causes of action. 979 F.2d at 984. The plaintiff, which supplied
security systems to government and commercial clients, sued De La Rue and Sygnetron
for breach of contract and a number of tortuous interferences with its business
relationships. Id. at 983. The jury awarded $100,000 in compensatory damages and
$1,000,000 in punitive damages to the plaintiff. Id. On the defendant's motion, the
court reduced the punitive damages award to $350,000 pursuant to the Virginia Code. Id.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the legislature intended this section to apply only to
unintentional torts. Id. at 984. The court held, however, that the statutory language "in
any action" meant exactly that, and the cap applied to this case. Id.
110. See supra notes 95-103, 105-07, and accompanying text for a discussion of why
Bagley, Mack Trucks, and Moseley disagreed with McBride; see also supra notes 63-72
and accompanying text for a discussion of McBride. Although the district court in
Chadima v. National Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 848 F. Supp. 1418, 1421 n.l (S.D. Iowa
1994), attempted to harmonize these cases by stating that McBride and Mack Trucks
decided different constitutional issues, this is not quite true. The Chadima decision
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although still good law in Colorado, is of questionable persuasive
authority in other jurisdictions in light of later case law interpreting
similar statutes. "
Kirk and McBride incorrectly found a right to punitive damages-
where none existed under the common or statutory law-by impermis-
sibly drawing a parallel between compensatory and punitive damages.
For example, the Kirk court reasoned that because the plaintiff had a
constitutional right to compensation, and because punitive damages
served a compensatory function, the punitive damages award became a
property right of the plaintiff upon judgment, like compensatory dam-
ages."'2 This interpretation clearly contravened not only the intent of
the Colorado General Assembly, but also the court's own previous
interpretation of the purposes of punitive damages.1 3 McBride also
confused the question whether the plaintiff had a property interest in a
punitive damages award.'1 4 It, like Kirk, misapplied compensatory
damages concepts to punitive damages awards: "awarding compen-
sation for human pain and suffering and the economic losses associ-
ated with such injuries ... [for the purpose of] remedying . . . ."' 5
states that McBride examined the statute under the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Constitution. Id. Actually, the McBride court examined a multitude of constitutional
challenges including those raised in Mack Trucks. See supra notes 63-72 (discussing
McBride); see also Pulla v. Amoco Oil Co., No. 4-91-CV-90085, 1994 WL 622135
(S.D. Iowa Nov. 9, 1994) (apparently relying on Chadima for the same unclear
proposition).
111. See supra notes 87-100 and infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text for a
discussion of those cases that have disagreed with Kirk; see also supra notes 73-80 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Kirk.
112. Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262, 267 & n.7, 272 (Colo. 1991) (en
banc).
113. See Frick v. Abell, 602 P.2d 852, 853-54 (Colo. 1979) (en banc) (stating that
punitive damages are to punish and deter) (citing Arkansas Valley Alfalfa Mills, Inc. v.
Day, 263 P.2d 815 (Colo. 1953)); see also Malandris v. Merrill Lynch, 703 F.2d 1152,
1177 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 824 (1983) (stating that Colorado
recognizes that the purpose of punitive damages is to punish and deter). At one time,
punitive damages were awarded under the common law of Colorado, but the Supreme
Court of Colorado struck down this rule in 1884, forbidding punitive damages awards
altogether. Kirk, 818 P.2d at 266 & n.5 (citing Murphy v. Hobbs, 5 Pa. 119 (1884)).
The Colorado General Assembly reacted to Murphy, however, by enacting legislation
which permitted punitive damages where defendants acted with "'fraud, malice or insult,
or a wanton and reckless disregard for the party's rights and feelings."' Id. (quoting
1889 Colo. Sess. Laws 64-65). Presumably, if the court could abolish punitive
damages, then the award could not represent constitutionally protected compensation.
114. McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1574-75. However, the court never seriously looked
at whether a quid pro quo existed. See id. at 1575 (examining examples of other quid pro
quos, and simply dismissing the state's proffered explanation).
115. See id. at 1579 (emphasis added). The McBride court erroneously refused to
apply the Georgia Supreme Court decisions Kelly v. Hall, 12 S.E.2d 881 (Ga. 1941) and
Teasley, 255 S.E.2d 57. McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1573-74; see also id. at 1574-76
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Neither Colorado nor Georgia had previously recognized a com-
pensatory role for punitive damages, however, and the courts'
reasoning simply misinterpreted those jurisdictions' laws." 6
Alternatively, Kirk may be an aberration simply because of seman-
tics, rather than evidence of any constitutional right to receive punitive
damages. The language in section 13-21-102(4) of the Colorado Code
disclaimed any interest in a punitive damages award until after the
entry of judgment." 7 The Kirk court determined that the legislature
could not step in after judgment, as the statute provided, since the
entire award vested in the plaintiff at the time of judgment.'" By
contrast, the Florida statute held constitutional in Gordon simply stated
that a portion of the award "shall be payable" to the State of Florida,
and did not specify that the state had no interest prior to judgment.' 9
(rejecting Teasley). Later Georgia courts agreed with the defendant, however, relying on
Kelly to establish the general rule that there is no vested right in a claim for damages
until the court enters judgment. See Mack Trucks, 436 S.E.2d at 639. Moreover, both
Mack Trucks and Bagley cited Teasley for the proposition that if the legislature can
eliminate punitive damages, it can certainly regulate them. See id. at 638 (Teasley
stands for proposition that there is no constitutional right to punitive damages);
Bagley, 410 S.E.2d at 739 (arguing that Teasley stands for proposition that if the
legislature can eliminate punitive damages it can also regulate them); see also Teasley,
255 S.E.2d at 58-59 (holding that the elimination of exemplary damages under no-fault
insurance does not violate due process, equal protection, or right of access to the courts).
McBride distinguished Teasley on the grounds that the Georgia no-fault act at issue in
that case provided the plaintiff with a quid pro quo absent in the punitive damages
statute: no-fault liability. McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1575.
116. See supra notes 113 and 115 for a discussion of the case law in Colorado and
Georgia that establishes that plaintiffs have no right to punitive damages. See also
Kirk, 818 P.2d at 274-75 (Rovira, C.J., & Lohr, J., dissenting) (arguing that although
two remedies are interrelated, exemplary damages are unique and subject to statutory
restrictions).
117. See infra note 119 for the text of this statute and the comparison of similar
language held constitutional in a Florida statute.
118. Kirk, 818 P.2d at 267 & n.7, 270-71.
119. Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800, 801 (Fla. 1992). Compare FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.73(2)(b) (Supp. 1986) (amended 1994, see supra note 88):
If the cause of action was based on personal injury or wrongful death, 60
percent of the award shall be payable to the Public Medical Assistance Trust
Fund created in § 409.2662; otherwise, 60 percent of the award shall be
payable to the General Revenue Fund.
Id. (emphasis added) with COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102(4), which reads in
pertinent part:
One-third of all reasonable damages collected pursuant to this section shall be
paid into the state general fund. The remaining two-thirds of such damages
collected shall be paid to the injured party. Nothing in this subsection (4)
shall be construed to give the general fund any interest in the claim for
exemplary damages or in the litigation itself at any time prior to payment
becoming due.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Quite possibly, had the Colorado legislature not disclaimed any interest
in the award prior to judgment, the Kirk court might not have found a
constitutional violation.' 20
C. Henderson v. Alabama Power Company: The Recent
Chink in the Legislative Armor
Only one court since McBride and Kirk has found a statute regu-
lating the award of punitive damages unconstitutional. In Henderson
v. Alabama Power Co.,' 21 the Alabama Supreme Court held that
section 6-11-21 of the Alabama Code, which placed a flat cap on puni-
tive damages at $250,000, violated the plaintiff's common-law right to
a trial by jury.'22 In Henderson, a jury awarded punitive damages of
$500,000 against a defendant, in addition to compensatory dam-
ages. 23 The trial court reviewed the jury award and determined that it
was not excessive. 24 The court nevertheless reduced the punitive
120. However, the dispute may instead concern whether the entire award vests in the
plaintiff, or whether only a portion of the award does so. If the court believed that the
entire award vests in the plaintiff, then the Kirk decision is difficult to square with the
later decisions such as Gordon or Mack Trucks, which held that the entire award never
vests in the plaintiff, but rather only that portion to which the plaintiff is entitled. See
supra note 52 for a discussion of the difficulty in drafting these statutes.
More recently, in Finley v. Empiregas Inc., 28 F.3d 782 (8th Cir. 1994), the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit compared § 537.675(3) of the Missouri Code against
§ 768.73(2)(b) of the Florida Code to determine if Missouri had a present interest in
collecting its percentage of the punitive damages award. Id. at 785. The court did not
reach the constitutional issue because it found the language of the statute dispositive.
The court drew a distinction between the Florida language, which stated that a portion of
the award "shall be payable" to the State of Florida, and § 537.675(2) of the Missouri
Code, which stated that a portion of the punitive damages award "shall be deemed
rendered in favor of the state of Missouri." Id. (emphasis in Finley). According to the
Eighth Circuit, the term "deeming" had no procedure in federal court for execution. Id.
Therefore, the State of Missouri had no present interest of record in the underlying
judgment upon which to execute. Id. The plaintiff in Finley argued that the state statute
could not be applied in federal court because of the Supremacy Clause, but the court did
not reach this issue because it found that the Missouri legislature did not intend its
statute to apply in federal court. Id. It is possible, therefore, that the Kirk court could
have held the statute unconstitutional simply because the legislature had worded it
incorrectly by specifically interfering with a post-judgment award.
121. 627 So. 2d 878 (Ala. 1993).
122. Id. at 893-94. See ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (reading in pertinent part: "An award of
punitive damages shall not exceed $250,000, unless it is based upon one or more of the
following [exceptions]:. ... ).
123. Henderson, 627 So. 2d at 880. At trial, the plaintiff, a child who had suffered
bums while climbing on a transmission tower, brought suit against the Alabama Power
Company on negligence and wantonness claims. Id.
124. Id. Alabama law requires post-verdict review by the trial and appellate courts, a
practice approved by the Supreme Court in Pacific Mut. Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1
(1991). See ALA. CODE § 6-11-23 (requiring trial court to conduct post-verdict hearing
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damages award to the $250,000 statutory cap."z
On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court held that although the
plaintiff had no constitutional right to punitive damages under the
Alabama Constitution, he did have the common-law right to have a
jury determine the amount of punitive damages-a right that had
existed since the adoption of that constitution.16  Furthermore, the
court reasoned that this historical, constitutionally preserved function
could not be taken away by the legislature, but only by an amendment
to the constitution itself.'27 Accordingly, the statutory cap limiting
recovery to $250,000 violated the plaintiff's right to a trial by jury.' 28
Despite this apparent return to the Kirk and McBride camp, Hen-
derson makes no sense. For example, the Henderson court failed to
explain why the trial judge could reduce a jury award without violating
the jury's function, while the legislature could not. 29 This post-
verdict reduction of jury awards by judges, termed a remittitur, does
the very thing that the Henderson court found unconstitutional: it
changes the jury award to what a third party believes fair. 30 Ac-
concerning punitive damages and to adjust or decrease award if appropriate in light of all
evidence).
125. Henderson, 627 So. 2d at 880. See supra note 122 for the text of Alabama's
statute limiting punitive damages.
126. Henderson, 627 So. 2d at 884, 888-89. The Alabama Constitution provides
"'[t]hat the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate."' Id. at 884 (quoting ALA.
CONST. of 1901 art. I, § 11). Even though Alabama law permitted punitive damages only
by statute, the majority noted that once punitive damages were available, it was
exclusively the jury's discretion whether they would award punitive damages and if so,
what amount. Id. at 886-87; see also id. at 901 (Maddox, J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part) (noting that the legislature has the power to remit punitive damages
in light of the Supreme Court and the Alabama courts' concern regarding excessive
verdicts); id. at 905 (Houston, J., dissenting) (stating that the legislature was
empowered by the constitution to enact a statute regulating punitive damages awards).
Just as a trial court could not insist that a given jury "should" award punitive damages
under Alabama law, the legislature could not prohibit juries from awarding an amount
commensurate to the wrongdoing shown by the evidence in a particular case. Id. at 886-
87. Alternatively, the court implied that any statute which required a punitive damages
award would violate the defendant's right to a trial by jury. See id. at 886.
127. Id. at 891, 893.
128. Id. at 893-94.
129. See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Alabama
statute. The Alabama Supreme Court exacerbated this dilemma in its subsequent
decision, Bozeman v. Busby, 639 So. 2d 501 (Ala. 1994), where it held that the
plaintiffs right to a trial by jury forbids a trial judge from increasing an award, although
the provision did not forbid the judge from reducing the award. Id. at 502.
130. Remittitur is a common practice; courts have traditionally reduced jury awards
that they believe are excessive. See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2335-
38 (1994) (acknowledging that courts will reduce jury awards that appear excessive);
Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20-22 (approving Alabama's post-verdict mechanism to reduce jury
awards that appear excessive). See generally Irene D. Sann, Remittiturs (and Additurs) in
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cordingly, Henderson stands in stark contrast to the court's judicial
procedures to reduce unfair jury awards. 3'
Apparently recognizing this dichotomy, the Alabama Supreme Court
stated, in Bozeman v. Busby,132 that trial judges could reduce jury
awards because they traditionally had done SO. 13' The Bozeman
court's reasoning, of course, implied that the legislature never had this
traditional power. But legislative restrictions on punitive awards also
existed at the time of the adoption of the Alabama Constitution.134
Because of the historical ability of both the judiciary and legislature to
change or limit a punitive damages award, it is difficult to find merit in
the court's decision that tradition prohibited the legislature from regu-
lating punitive damages awards, but not the judiciary. 135
In fact, the issue in Henderson may well be a question concerning
the separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary, and
not a question of the constitutional rights of the plaintiff at all. The
Alabama Supreme Court decided Henderson after the United States
Supreme Court decided Haslip,136 in which the Court held that
Alabama's post-verdict scheme adequately protected the due process
rights of defendants. 13  It is quite possible that the Henderson court,
the Federal Courts: An Evaluation With Suggested Alternatives, 38 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 157 (1987) (discussing the history and usage of remittitur, by which courts reduce
jury awards that appear irrational or unfair); Irene D. Sann, Note, Remittitur Practice in
the Federal Courts, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 299 (1976) (same).
131. Compare Henderson, 627 So. 2d at 884, 888-89 (stating that a statutory cap
violates a trial by jury) and Bozeman, 639 So. 2d at 502 (finding that additur violates
trial by jury) with ALA. CODE § 6-11-23 (declaring that judge is to adjust award if
excessive) and Haslip, 499 U.S. I (approving a post-verdict review to adjust awards
downward). Despite the Henderson court's assumption that the Alabama practice was
constitutional, the Supreme Court has never examined whether the Seventh Amendment
allows remittitur. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 279
n.25 (1989).
132. 639 So. 2d 501 (Ala. 1994).
133. Id. at 502-03. The court reasoned that the trial court reduced jury awards that
violated the due process rights of the defendant. Id. Interestingly, the United States
Supreme Court did not decide that due process required that punitive damages awards be
reasonable until 1991. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18 (holding that due process requires that
punitive damages awards be reasonable).
134. Henderson, 627 So. 2d at 904-06 (Houston, J., dissenting) (explaining that
while trial by jury is a fundamental concept of individual liberty, restrictions on
punitive damages awards do not abrogate this right, because the legislature has had
power to regulate awards since the inception of Alabama Constitution); see also Honda,
114 S. Ct. at 2342 (reporting that judicial review of jury awards existed at the time of the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution).
135. See Honda, 114 S. Ct. at 2342 & n.12.
136. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
137. Id. at 23-24. See supra notes 32-36 and infra note 160, for a discussion of
Haslip.
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knowing that the Supreme Court in Haslip had approved of Alabama's
common law concerning its assessment of the fairness of punitive
damages awards, simply saw no reason to let the legislature take that
control out of their own hands. 38 The Haslip Court held only that the
Alabama procedure, as it existed then, did not violate the Due Process
Clause. 139 But that opinion also noted that Alabama had passed a
statute regulating the awards as well. 40 It is perhaps for this reason
that the Henderson court so carefully found a right under the state
constitution, and not under the federal one.' 4'
Despite the preliminary victories against limitations on punitive
damages in McBride, Kirk, and Henderson, courts deciding the con-
stitutionality on due process, equal protection, and trial by jury
grounds now generally agree that no general constitutional right to
punitive damages exists. 42 Future courts, however, must resolve
whether statutory restrictions bear a rational relationship to the purpose
of the legislation under either the state or federal constitutional pro-
visions. 143 In addition, these courts must address whether the statute
138. See Henderson, 627 So. 2d at 894, where the court discusses the post-verdict
review factors approved by the Supreme Court in Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21-22, and justifies
its holding that the statute is unconstitutional because the Alabama legislature could not
give the particularized verdicts that a jury could give.
139. Honda, 114 S. Ct. at 2346-47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
140. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20 n.9; see also Henderson, 627 So. 2d at 900-01 (Maddox,
J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (arguing that Haslip's citation to the new
statute indicated the Court's approval).
141. See Henderson, 627 So. 2d at 885 (deciding the issue under the Alabama
Constitution only); see also id. at 895 (Maddox, J., concurring in part & dissenting in
part) (arguing that the statute concerns federal and state constitutional rights and federal
issues should have been decided).
142. See, e.g., Wackenhut Applied Technologies Ctr., Inc. v. Sygnetron Protection
Sys., Inc., 979 F.2d 980, 985 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl.
Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 83-84 (1978)) (noting that the parties stipulated that the cap
on punitive damages was an economic regulation); Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 801-02
(holding that a plaintiff has no right to recover punitive damages, nor a property right
until judgment is rendered); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635, 638 (Ga.
1993) (holding that a plaintiff has no constitutional right to an award of punitive
damages). Only Kirk recognized a "right" to punitive damages by virtue of the award
vesting in the plaintiff. See Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262, 273 (Colo.
1991) (en banc) (noting that a judgment represents a property right held by the plaintiff
as a judgment creditor). Many commentators agree that the plaintiff has no right to
punitive damages. See, e.g., Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for
Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269, 292 (1983) (arguing that
plaintiffs have no right to punitive damages); Grube, supra note 6, at 873-74 (same).
143. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of the due process
and equal protection challenges made by plaintiffs; see infra notes 145-97 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the probable resolution of this issue in future
decisions.
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violates a plaintiff's right to a trial by jury.' 44 The following Part ex-
amines the prospects of future constitutional challenges to statutes
restricting the award of punitive damages in both state and federal
courts.
VI. THE FUTURE OF THE CAMPAIGN: WILL COURTS CONTINUE
TO AVOID CONFLICT WITH STATE LEGISLATURES?
The future of state statutory restrictions on punitive damages
depends entirely on whether the courts will continue to defer to state
legislatures. Such an alliance will most likely continue for several
reasons. First, although plaintiffs continue to raise challenges con-
cerning their "right" to punitive damages, future courts will not
seriously entertain them. 45 Second, most statutes regulating punitive
damages awards bear a rational relation to a legitimate state goal.
46
Third, although state constitutional guarantees of a trial by jury may
appear to provide plaintiffs with a surefire method of bypassing the
statutory restrictions, future courts will be reluctant to find the
ephemeral right to a jury award of punitive damages. 47  Finally,
underpinning each decision lies the courts' implicit recognition of the
legislative power to subordinate the traditional purposes of punitive
damages to the social need to rein them in.' 4
A. The Federal Constitution Provides Ammunition Against
Due Process and Equal Protection Challenges
Most equal protection and due process challenges to the statutes
restricting awards of punitive damages arise under the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 149 Courts have
held that a plaintiff has no constitutional right to a punitive damages
award prior to the entry of judgment, under either the state or the
federal constitution. 50 In light of its precedent and current com-
144. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the trial by
jury challenges made by plaintiffs; see infra notes 198-208 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the probable resolution of this issue in future decisions.
145. See infra notes 149-68 and accompanying text.
146. See infra part VI.A.2-3.
147. See infra part VI.B.
148. See infra part VI.C.
149. See supra notes 10-16, 60-101, and accompanying text; see also 1 SCHLUETER &
REDDEN, supra note 9, § 3.12. Although plaintiffs raising these claims often also do so
under the corresponding state constitutional provision, no court considering this
challenge in the context of state statutory restrictions apparently has drawn a
distinction between the federal and state constitutional protection.
150. See supra notes 86-100 and accompanying text; see also Grube, supra note 6, at
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position, the United States Supreme Court is unlikely to deviate from
the reasoning of these lower federal and state courts.' 5' Instead, the
most likely issue in future battles will be the question whether the
statute bears a rational relation to a legitimate legislative purpose.'52
Most statutes will easily pass this test, but not all will clear this consti-
tutional hurdle. 53
1. No Constitutional or Common-Law Right to
Punitive Damages
The general consensus of state courts and lower federal courts
finding no general constitutional or common-law right to punitive dam-
ages comports with two long-standing United States Supreme Court
decisions. 54 The earliest decision acknowledging that an entity other
than the jury could set punitive damages limitations occurred in Barry
v. Edmunds,5 5 which held that juries can set damages awards only
where no precise rule fixes their size. 156 More recently, in Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.,57 the Court
held that it would presume statutory limitations on damages valid as
economic regulation, unless the limitations were shown to be arbitrary
or irrational.5 8 While this case addressed damages restrictions in
general, later courts have used it to justify specific restraints on
punitive damages awards. 5 9
Recent decisions suggest that the current Supreme Court will adhere
to these prior holdings. For example, Pacific Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Haslip, 6° 7XO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,'6' and
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg 62 each implicitly approved post-verdict
843 (arguing that plaintiffs have neither a moral nor a legal right to punitive damages).
151. See infra part VI.A.1.
152. See infra part VI.A.2-3.
153. See infra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 86-100 and accompanying text.
155. 116 U.S. 550 (1886).
156. Id. at 565 (cited by Haslip, 499 U.S. at 16).
157. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
158. Id. at 83.
159. See, e.g., McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1576 (M.D.
Ga. 1990) (citing Justice Stewart's concurrence in Duke to support erroneous conclusion
that a plaintiff has a property right in punitive damages, arising from the state-created
right to compensation for tort injuries); see also 1 SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 9,
§ 3.12 (citing Duke as starting point for any constitutional assessment of damages
caps).
160. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
161. 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
162. 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994).
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manipulation of jury awards to protect the due process rights of
defendants, underscoring that plaintiffs do not have a constitutional or
common-law right to a certain amount of punitive damages. 163 In fact,
most of the Justices, if not all, have agreed implicitly or expressly that
the legislature could restrict awards by imposing statutory caps. For
example, in Haslip, the majority agreed that punitive damages could be
regulated by post-verdict judicial review, and, in fact, so required in
Honda.'64 Justices Brennan and Marshall specifically have stated that
state legislatures can restrict the amount of punitive damages awards
by statute, implying that this would be the preferable way to protect the
due process rights of defendants. 165 In addition, Justice O'Connor,
who dissented in Haslip, also has argued that state legislatures may
restrict the award of punitive damages. 166 Justice Ginsburg, dis-
senting in Honda, supported Oregon's practice of limiting punitive
damages awards by a pre-verdict "damage cap" of the amount speci-
163. See, e.g., id. at 2340-41 (holding that Oregon's statutory denial of judicial
review of punitive damages jury awards violates due process); TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2711
(holding that post-verdict review and meaningful jury instructions provide objective
criteria which satisfies due process concerns); Haslip, 499 U.S. at 43 (holding that
Alabama's objective criteria for assessing punitive damages awards, including post-
verdict review and meaningful jury instructions, insulate punitive award from due process
challenge). The assertion that due process places limits on the amount of punitive
damages awarded against a defendant is not new. See St. Louis I.M. & S. Ry. v.
Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66-67 (1919); Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238
U.S. 482 (1915); Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U.S. 270, 286 (1912); Seaboard Air
Line Ry. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 78 (1907) (all cited in TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2718, for
the proposition that due process places limits on the amount of penalties, although only
Danaher set aside a verdict as plainly irrational because there was no bad faith on the part
of the defendant).
164. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20 & n.9 (Blackmun, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
White, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ.) (citing with apparent approval Alabama's newly
enacted statutory cap); id. at 16 (citing Barry for proposition that a "precise rule of law
[could] fix[] the recoverable damages"); id. at 20-21 (approving post-trial procedures
including comparison to similar awards and post-verdict judicial review); see also
Honda, 114 S. Ct. at 2340-41 (holding that due process requires post-verdict review to
reduce unreasonable punitive damages awards).
165. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("State legislatures and courts
have the power to restrict or abolish the common law practice of punitive damages, and
in recent years have increasingly done so.") (citations to statutes omitted); see also id.
at 42 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (common law principles must suffice until the legislature
implements system-wide change; state courts could urge reexamination of punitive
damages awards by legislatures).
166. See id. at 57 (O'Connor, I., dissenting). In her dissent, Justice O'Connor stated
that "state legislatures could establish fixed monetary limits for awards of punitive
damages .... [Where] the legislatively determined ranges are sufficiently narrow, they
could function as meaningful constraints on jury discretion while at the same time
permitting juries to render individualized verdicts." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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fled in the complaint. 67 Of all the Justices addressing this issue, each
has, in some way, shown approval of statutory damages caps.'
16
2. The Weakest Front: Rational Relation to Legitimate
State Interests
Because plaintiffs have no cognizable right to punitive damages
prior to the entry of judgment, the ultimate constitutional question
depends on whether the legislation fairly nd rationally relates to a
legitimate state purpose. 169 Consequently, the Court will invalidate a
statutory restriction on punitive damages only where the legislation is
arbitrary or irrational.170 While most statutory regulations on punitive
damages survive this scrutiny, complications may arise where the
legislature intended the statute to protect the defendants' due process
rights. 7 '
167. Honda, 114 S. Ct. at 2344 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing with approval
Oregon's punitive "damage cap," limiting the award to the amount specified in the
complaint).
168. See supra notes 164-67. Although he has apparently never squarely confronted
the issue whether statutory restrictions on punitive damages are constitutional, the
newest Supreme Court Justice, Stephen Breyer, will probably agree that they are. In
Schafer v. American Cyanamid Co., 20 F.3d I (1st Cir. 1994), he authored an opinion
which examined a similar issue concerning whether the National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-I to -34 (1991 & Supp. 1994), could prevent parents
from recovering damages for injury to their child. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 5, § 8.8
(noting that the Vaccine Act functions as an indirect cap on punitive damages awards).
The Act provided a plaintiff with a choice: a straightforward recovery system, including
a statutory cap on the amount of punitive damages that could be awarded, or the
unpredictable traditional tort recovery system. Schafer, 20 F.3d at 3. The legislative
history showed that Congress balanced the need for speedy compensation to victims
contracting illnesses from vaccines against the need to reduce insurance and litigation
costs for manufacturers. Id. at 2. Then-Chief Judge Breyer held that the statute and its
history did not specifically preclude parents from recovery, but instead discouraged them
from bringing traditional tort actions, which reduced litigation and high insurance
costs. Id. at 5-7. Since the purpose behind many state statutes limiting the amount of
punitive damages is often to reduce litigation and high insurance costs, it is at least
arguable that Justice Breyer would support these statutes as well. See supra notes 48-50,
55-57, and accompanying text for a discussion of the purpose of such statutory
restrictions. In Schafer, Justice Breyer, however, advocated examining legislative
histories to ensure that interpretation of a statute comports with the legislative intent,
and most state statutes apparently have little to no legislative history to assess. See
Schafer, 20 F.3d at 2, 5-7 (examining legislative histories); see also Stephen Breyer, On
the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992)
(approving the examination of legislative histories).
169. Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. 83.
170. Id. at 83. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Duke.
171. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18-19 (noting that due process raises concerns of reasona-
bleness and adequate judicial guidance).
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On one hand, the Supreme Court, lower federal courts, and state
courts will most likely continue to find constitutional those statutes
enacted as part of tort reform. In light of the tort crisis, courts should
uphold legislative cost-benefit determinations that a certain dollar
amount represents the acceptable outer limits of punitive damages.
7 2
For this same reason, courts should also defer to the legislative pur-
pose to share punitive damages awards with the public for harm that
endangers society as a whole.'
On the other hand, courts may question the validity of a statute if the
legislature enacted it strictly to protect the due process rights of
defendants. Bright-line punitive damages restrictions cannot ensure
that awards below that limit are indeed fair, absent other constitutional
protection required in the Supreme Court's Haslip-TXO-Honda tril-
ogy.'74 For example, absent judicial oversight, unreasonable awards
could still result from unbridled jury discretion for those awards below
the statutory minimum. 75 Even an award capped by the statutory limit
may fail to protect the defendant's due process rights, absent other
procedural protection to ensure that the award was fair in the first
place. 176 Nor do statutes redirecting a percentage of the punitive
damages award into a state fund necessarily protect the due process
rights of defendants, because they too provide no procedure to ensure
the fairness of those awards. 177 Nevertheless, these statutes may re-
172. See id. at 7-8 & n.4 (discussing the tort crisis); see supra notes 1, 30-31, and
accompanying text for a discussion of the tort crisis in the United States. Lower federal
and state courts have upheld these purposes of statutory restriction on punitive damages
awards. See, e.g., Wackenhut, 979 F.2d at 985-87 (upholding the Virginia legislature's
goal to cap punitive damages to prevent awards that burden the state's economy); Mack
Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635, 638-39 (Ga. 1993) (upholding the legislative
intent to not provide a windfall to the plaintiff).
173. See, e.g., Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1647 (1993) (approving legislative objectives to "allot to the public
weal a portion of damages designed to deter future harm ... and to discourage punitive
damage claims by making them less remunerative to the claimant and the claimant's
attorney").
1 74. See supra notes 32-36, 160-68, and accompanying text for a discussion of these
cases.
175. See Johnson v. Hugo's Skateway, 974 F.2d 1408, 1415 n.6 (4th Cir. 1992)
(noting that the $350,000 statutory cap does not necessarily protect the punitive award
from due process scrutiny).
176. See Honda, 114 S. Ct. at 2340-41 (arguing that the elimination of judicial
review by constitutional amendment fails to protect defendants' due process rights).
177. These statutes may not provide Haslip protection, because they do not even
provide a statutory cap. Instead, their purpose is to divert a portion of the award to a
public use, and as a result they focus on the use of the award, rather than the procedure by
which the award punishes the defendant. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text
for a discussion of this type of statutory restriction and its purpose.
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present one factor insulating a punitive damages award against an
attack on unbridled jury discretion. 7'
Statutes requiring that a punitive damages award stand in some fixed
ratio to actual damages awarded may withstand the arbitrary test, since
Haslip implicitly approved such a scheme. 79 In fact, commentators
have suggested that the fairest procedure is to limit the punitive award
to either twice the amount of compensatory damages, or $250,000,
whichever is greater, on the grounds that doing so grants the trier of
fact flexibility without being handcuffed to a strict ratio. 80 Never-
theless, standing alone, the ratio requirement may also fail to withstand
constitutional muster absent any other procedural protection.'
3. Surprising Allies: Some Statutes May Violate Defendants'
Constitutional Rights
Although plaintiffs most frequently challenge the constitutionality of
punitive damages restrictions, defendants could also contest them. For
example, defendants may argue that a statute fails to protect their due
process rights under the Haslip-TXO -Honda trilogy, similar to the
plaintiffs' challenge that such statutes bear no rational relation to their
178. See Wackenhut Applied Technologies Ctr., Inc. v. Sygnetron Protection Sys.,
Inc., 979 F.2d 980, 985 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting that a statutory cap may be one factor to
insulate punitive damages award from constitutional attack); Hugo's Skateway, 974 F.2d
at 1415 n.6 (same); see also Henderson, 627 So. 2d at 900-01 (1993) (Maddox, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part) (arguing that jury awards without any standards
such as punitive damages caps can violate constitutional due process rights of
defendants).
179. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23-24 (approving an award four times the compensatory
damages although acknowledging that it may be close to the line). But see TXO, 113 S.
Ct. at 2721 (approving an award 526 times the amount of compensatory damages
because this ratio is only one factor to determine the amount of punitive damages). In
fact, some states do not permit a correlation under the common law, and it is difficult to
reconcile these cases with Haslip. See Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc., 555 A.2d
800, 802-03 (Pa. 1989) (noting that courts may not require that punitive damages bear
any relationship to compensatory damages).
180. See, e.g., Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 31, at 1378-79. These authors note
that the American College of Trial Lawyers and the American Law Institute have
approved this approach. Id. Some states have adopted similar approaches. See N.D.
CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11(4) (limiting punitive damages to $250,000 or twice the actual
damages, whichever is greater); TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 41.007 (punitive
damages limited to $200,000 or four times actual damages, whichever is greater).
181. See TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2721 ("[B]oth [West Virginia's and Alabama's] State
Supreme Courts and this Court have eschewed an approach that concentrates entirely on
the relationship between actual and punitive damages."); see also Schwartz & Behrens,
supra note 31, at 1380. Schwartz and Behrens point out that this ratio may fail to
protect the due process rights of defendants against unreasonable awards, for example,
where the defendant is subject to numerous awards for the same act. Id.
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purposes.8 2 Accordingly, statutes that cap damages at a certain
amount may not ensure that the awards are reasonable against a
specific defendant.
Furthermore, defendants may resurrect excessive fines as well as
double jeopardy challenges to statutes which redirect a piece of the
punitive pie into a government fund. 183 The Supreme Court, in
Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,814 held that the
Eighth Amendment's protection against excessive fines did not apply
to punitive damages awards between private parties, but instead ap-
plied only to fines paid to the benefit of a government.' 85 Two years
later, however, in McBride, the federal district court in Georgia held
that the Constitution's prohibition against excessive fines did apply to
statutes diverting a portion of the award into a state fund, because the
award benefited the government. 86 But McBride stands alone, since
at least two subsequent courts disagreed with its holding.
In 1994, for example, the Iowa Supreme Court, in Spaur v. Owens-
Coming Fiberglas Corp.,187 held that payment of a portion of the
punitive damages award to the government did not transform the suit
into a governmental prosecution. 8 Consequently, the statute trig-
gered neither the Double Jeopardy nor the Excessive Fines Clauses of
the Federal Constitution. 189 The Spaur court reasoned that the State
neither prosecuted the action nor attempted to extract a large penalty for
the purpose of raising revenue.' 90 Instead, the state fund stood
separate from the state treasury, and used the money for a public pur-
pose: to help indigents, and not to fund the state.' 9' Because of the
distinction between the state interest and the public interest, section
668.1(2)(b) of the Iowa Code did not rise to a criminal or quasi-
criminal statute. 92 This holding comports with the District Court for
the Southern District of Iowa's earlier interpretation of Iowa law in
Burke v. Deere, 93 where it held that payment of a percentage of
182. See supra notes 174-81 and accompanying text.
183. See infra notes 184-97 and accompanying text.
184. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
185. Id. at 262-64 (Excessive Fines Clause of Constitution does not apply to private
actors, only state actors).
186. 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1566-67 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
187. 510 N.W.2d 854 (Iowa 1994).
188. Id. at 868-69.
189. Id. at 869.
190. Id. at 868.
191. Id. at 868-69.
192. Id. at 869.
193. 780 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D. Iowa 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 6 F.3d 497 (8th
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punitive damages into a state trust did not raise Eighth Amendment
concerns.19
4
McBride's holding that payment to the government fund at issue
raised excessive fines and double jeopardy issues flows naturally from
its premise that the state has no legitimate interest in a punitive dam-
ages award, since the award belongs in its entirety either to the plaintiff
or the defendant.' 95 As Spaur and Burke indicate, however, where it
is not the state that has an interest, but instead the public, the state may
require payment into a public fund. 196 Defendants' best chances for
victory consequently may lie in due process challenges to the stat-
utes.' 97 Nevertheless, most likely few defendants will challenge the
statutes on any grounds, since these statutes do, in fact, promote lower
awards. Instead, defendants will be more likely to stave off plaintiffs'
attacks on the statutes.
B. Smith v. Printup: The State Constitutional Chink in the
Legislative Armor Is Small Indeed
Because it is unlikely that future courts will find statutory restric-
tions on punitive damages unconstitutional under equal protection or
due process challenges, plaintiffs may increasingly challenge these
statutes under the state constitutional provisions, as did the plaintiff in
Henderson.'98 Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Henderson, like Kirk
or McBride, is any more than a slight step back in an ongoing tide of
court decisions upholding punitive damage statutes as constitutional.'
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1063 (1994).
194. Id. at 1242. But cf. McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1573, 1577-78. In McBride, the
district court held that governmental involvement converted the civil nature of the
punitive damages award into a fine for the benefit of the state. Id. at 1578. Although
one commentator has argued that McBride misapplied the Eighth Amendment because
the court used it to protect the plaintiff, rather than the defendant, McBride issued a
declaratory judgment in which it looked at all the constitutional challenges that could be
made. See Grube, supra note 6, at 866-71 (discussing both McBride and Burke, and
noting that McBride protected the plaintiff on Eighth Amendment grounds).
195. See McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1578-79 (holding that punitive damages are a
compensatory and an economic right of the plaintiff).
196. See supra notes 187-94 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
challenges, which could be made either by the plaintiff or by the defendant.
198. See Henderson v. Alabama Power Co., 627 So. 2d 878, 893 (Ala. 1993)
(prioritizing plaintiff's right to a trial by jury over legislative power); see also Manzer,
supra note 6, at 647 (arguing that restrictions on non-economic punitive damages
violate the right to trial by jury).
199. McBride and Kirk are the only cases other than Henderson which have found a
statute restricting the award of punitive damages unconstitutional. See supra notes 63-
82 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
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Henderson stands alone as the only court to find that a statute
violates the plaintiff's right to a trial by jury. Post-Henderson courts
discount its reasoning entirely. In 1994, the Kansas Supreme Court
specifically disagreed with Henderson when it upheld a statute in
Smith v. Printup2°° that not only limited the punitive damages award
but also took it out of the hands of the jury entirely.20' According to
the Printup court, section 60-3701 of the Kansas Code, which re-
quired that a judge, not a jury, determine the amount of a punitive
damages award, did not impair the plaintiffs right to a trial by jury
under the Kansas Constitution.202 Disagreeing with the reasoning of
the majority in Henderson, the Printup court held that Kansas had
always drawn a distinction between compensatory and punitive dam-
ages, and that a plaintiff had only a right to compensatory damages.2 3
Moreover, the right to compensation did not include either a consti-
tutional or common-law right to have a jury determine the amount of
punitive damages awards. 2° Consequently, the legislature could
regulate the award, either by a statutory cap or other restriction, or by
requiring the judge to determine the award.205
The United States Supreme Court would most likely agree with
Printup, rather than Henderson, since the Court has long stated that to
hold all procedural changes unconstitutional would "deny every quality
of the law but its age, and . . . render it incapable of progress or
improvement." 20 6 More recently, in Honda, the Court elevated the
need for reasonable punitive damages awards over the right to a trial
200. 866 P.2d 985 (Kan. 1993).
201. Id. at 998.
202. Id. The court also held that the statute did not violate the plaintiff's due process
or equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. See id. at 991-92, 998-99. The court exhaustively examined the case law
concerning statutory caps, including most of the cases cited within. See id. at 992-98.
203. Id. at 997. The court agreed instead with the Henderson dissenters, Judges
Houston and Maddox. Id. at 997-98. Judge Houston had argued that punitive damages do
not represent a right of the plaintiff; Judge Maddox had argued that if the legislature
could abolish punitive damages, then it could limit them. Id. (citing Henderson, 627 So.
2d at 899 n. 11 (Maddox, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part), 909 (Houston, J.,
dissenting)). The Printup court acknowledged that the plaintiffs had not attacked the
right of the legislature to cap punitive damages, but instead alleged that vesting the
right to award punitive damages in a judge rather than a jury violated their right to a trial
by jury. Id. at 998. Nevertheless, the court followed the reasoning of the Henderson
dissenters, holding that nothing in the Kansas common law or constitution prevented
the legislature from vesting the power in the judge rather than the jury. Id.
204. Id. at 998.
205. Id.
206. Hurtardo v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 529 (1884) (cited in Honda Motor Co. v.
Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2340 (1994)).
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by jury when it held a state constitutional amendment unconstitutional
because the amendment eliminated post-verdict review of punitive
damages awards.207 Accordingly, both the Supreme Court, as well as
state courts, would likely find that plaintiffs have neither a right to
receive punitive damages nor a right to a jury trial on punitive dam-
ages. 2
08
C. Decisions from the Frontlines: Some Statutes Subordinate
the Traditional Purpose of Punitive Damages
to Other Social Interests
Underlying each victorious skirmish concerning statutory restric-
tions on punitive damages lies an implicit judicial acknowledgment of
the legislative ability to subordinate the traditional purposes of punitive
damages to other, more-compelling social goals. Commentators have
argued that statutory restrictions on a punitive damages award limit the
deterrent effect of punitive damages.2 9 But regardless of whether the
statutory restrictions fail to deter defendants, legislatures traditionally
have had the power to limit punitive damages or, in some jurisdictions,
to eliminate them altogether.10 Quite rightly, few courts have entered
the legislative bailiwick to assess the legitimacy of its cost-benefit
balancing of societal interests.2 '
One common challenge to statutory restrictions contends that defen-
dants simply calculate the flat caps into the costs of their actions,
undermining the award's deterrent effect as well as decreasing safety
standards.23 2 Most statutes, however, permit the judge to override
their statutory caps when a defendant's actions are malicious or
207. See Honda, 114 S. Ct. at 2341-42.
208. See supra notes 149-181 and accompanying text.
209. 2 DOBBS, supra note 5, § 8.1(6).
210. See supra note 41, infra note 226, and accompanying text.
211. But see infra notes 221-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the courts
that erroneously overstepped their authority.
212. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 5, § 8.1(6) (explaining that a statutory cap may permit
an actor engaging in wrongful conduct enough profit to continue the wrongful activity);
Jason S. Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in Tort Law, 87
COLUM. L. REv. 1385, 1406 (1987) (stating that punitive damages caps take away safety
incentives); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 1, at 1277 (contending that capping punitive
damages favors big business because they undermine deterrent effect); David I.
Rosenbaum, Comment, Punitive Damages in Professional Malpractice Cases, 61 TEMP.
L. REV. 1431, 1476 (1988) (arguing that punitive damages caps address liability but
limit deterrence); Toy, supra note 6, at 326 (asserting that defendants simply calculate
tort liability into the cost of business). But see Maskin & Antonucci, supra note 29, at
580-81 (maintaining that the ratio between compensatory and punitive damages over-
deters, destroys corporate existence, and violates the due process rights of defendants
involved in mass toxic tort claims).
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intentional.1 3 These exceptions permit the courts to tailor awards to
ensure deterrence for particularly wrongful acts.21 4 As a result, despite
these statutory caps, punitive damages remain a deterrent in most
jurisdictions, since defendants are unsure when their actions will fall
into an exception where the cap does not apply.1 5
Even if the restrictions permit defendants to calculate the award into
their own assessment of the cost of their actions, the role of the court
is to ensure only that the award is not arbitrary or irrational. 1 6 For
example, in Virginia, where the legislature has taken all discretion
from the hands of the judiciary, courts have rightly upheld the legis-
lation as constitutional.1 7 Such a limitation could realistically fail to
achieve the goal of deterrence for large corporations, to whom a one-
time $350,000 punitive damages award could be almost immaterial.1 8
Nevertheless, courts have deferred to the Virginia legislature's cost-
benefit determination, because the statute involves economic
regulation.1 9 Since the purpose of the statutes is specifically to restrict
the punitive award, and not to punish the defendant per se, the cap
itself is neither arbitrary nor irrational in light of these goals.
220
213. See supra notes 41-44 for a discussion of statutes that provide exceptions to the
flat statutory caps; Virginia remains the only state with a statutory cap without
exceptions. See also Rustad & Koenig, supra note 1, at 1281 n.67 (providing examples
of statutes permitting courts to override caps).
214. See supra notes 41-44 for a discussion of statutes that provide exceptions to the
flat statutory caps.
215. At least one commentator has suggested that regulatory agencies should step in
and perform the deterrence function by enforcing safety statutes. Owen, supra note 31,
at 672. The relevant agency would either fine violators or banish use of the results of
the violating act. Id.
216. Statutes requiring that the punitive award stand in some fixed ratio to the actual
damages may permit the defendant to more easily calculate the award, since the ratio
creates a more rigid rule. See Rustad and Koenig, supra note 1, at 1282 n.67; see also
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (examining
damages awards under the rational relation test).
217. See Wackenhut Applied Technologies Ctr., Inc. v. Sygnetron Protection Sys.,
Inc., 979 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1992) (upholding the Virginia statute even though it
applied to all awards); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (providing no exceptions to
the statutory cap).
218. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the purposes
of punitive damages. As the parties stipulated in the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Wackenhut, because the statute was an economic regulation, it consequently needed to
bear only a reasonable relation to its purpose. See Wackenhut, 979 F.2d at 985 (finding
that statute bears relationship to the statutory intent to protect society from runaway
punitive damages awards while continuing its deterrence and punishment functions).
219. See Wackenhut, 979 F.2d at 985 (deferring to the legislative purpose to strike a
balance between deterring defendants and burdening society).
220. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the purposes
behind punitive damages. If the purpose of the Virginia legislation was to punish the
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Few have crystallized this concern about the subordinate purpose of
punitive damages into the true issue: separation of powers between the
court and the legislature. But challengers are essentially asking the
courts to reject the legislative cost-benefit assessment. McBride, Kirk,
and Henderson represent examples of courts engaging in legal gym-
nastics in order to bypass legislative cost-benefit determinations. Each
overstepped its authority by failing to defer to the legislative deter-
mination that other social needs outweighed the purposes of punitive
damages. 22  For example, the McBride court held the Georgia
legislation to a higher standard than required under Duke by examining
the purpose of the legislation and determining whether or not it agreed
with that purpose.222 Since, in the McBride court's opinion, the goal
of protecting corporate viability was not legitimate, the court found the
legislation unconstitutional.223 Similarly, both Kirk and Henderson
failed to defer to the legislature, instead finding property or common-
law rights to a certain punitive damages award, which were previously
unavailable under their respective state laws.2 24
Kirk, McBride, and Henderson stand alone against the tide of
decisional law upholding the constitutionality of state statutory restric-
tions on punitive damages. Instead, the weight of authority clearly
indicates that courts defer to democratically elected legislatures,
examining only whether the statute bears a rational relation to its legiti-
mate purpose.225 Future courts will most likely agree that legislatures
defendant, it would be both arbitrary and irrational because it would effectively deter
only those defendants to whom $350,000 appeared significant.
221. The judiciary should defer to the legislature, unless it is clear beyond a
reasonable doubt that the statute violates a fundamental principle. See, e.g., Henderson,
627 So. 2d at 895-97 (Maddox, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). Judge
Maddox points out that the Supreme Court's analysis of the statute violates the
separation of powers between the two branches of government. Id. (Maddox, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part). In his opinion, Judge Maddox states that courts
should not strike down legislation unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the
legislation violates fundamental rights. Id. at 897 (Maddox, J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part); see also Schwartz & Behrens, supra note 31, at 1372-74 (arguing
that legislatures, not courts, should reform because they can best see the big picture).
222. McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1576-77 (M.D. Ga.
1990) (stating that the deterrence purpose of the statute was not advanced and that the
real purpose is to preserve the viability of Georgia business). The McBride court stands
alone as the only court to hold this legislative goal invalid. Cf. Gordon v. State, 608
So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam) (upholding a similar legislative intent as
valid), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1647 (1993).
223. McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1577.
224. See supra notes 73-82, 121-31, and accompanying text for a discussion of these
cases.
225. See supra notes 83-120 and accompanying text.
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may limit punitive damages, or subject them to certain conditions. 6
This growing alliance between state legislatures and the judiciary fore-
tells a future legislative victory over plaintiffs' constitutional assaults.
VII. CONCLUSION: ALTHOUGH LEGISLATURES MAY HAVE
LOST SOME BATTLES, THEY WILL MOST LIKELY WIN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL WAR
While the apparent alignment of state and federal courts with
legislatures may indicate a continued acceptance of state statutory re-
strictions on punitive damages, it is equally apparent that plaintiffs will
not acquiesce without a prolonged fight.227 Nevertheless, plaintiffs are
fighting a losing battle, for their intermittent triumphs indicate nothing
more than a minor setback in an otherwise certain legislative victory.2"
Future courts examining plaintiffs' due process and equal protection
challenges, including the United States Supreme Court, should con-
tinue to recognize that plaintiffs have no constitutional or common-law
right to punitive damages.229 Moreover, these courts will most likely
continue to find that legislation restricting punitive damages awards
reflects a legitimate governmental purpose.2" Since Henderson stands
alone amid a growing number of courts which refuse to find a right to
a jury trial on punitive damages, it is likely that future courts will con-
tinue the trend.23'
Future issues may arise, however, where the purposes of the legis-
lation focus on the due process rights of defendants.232 Statutory
restrictions may bear no reasonable relation to the severity of the harm,
and consequently fail to protect defendants' due process rights.233
226. See, e.g., Bagley v. Shortt, 410 S.E.2d 738, 739 (Ga. 1991) (stating that if the
legislature can eliminate them, it can regulate them); see also Kirk v. Denver Publishing
Co., 818 P.2d 262, 273, 274-75 (Colo. 1991) (Rovira, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that a
claim for exemplary damages is a statutory right which may be conditioned by the
legislature and consequently the entire award never vests in the plaintiff). Although the
Kirk court recognized that a legislative body might choose to eliminate exemplary
damages in civil cases without offending due process of law, it refused to acknowledge
that other legislative restrictions should pass constitutional muster, although it did not
give its reasons. Id. at 272-73 (Rovira, C.J., dissenting).
227. See supra parts IV-V for a discussion of the constitutional challenges that
plaintiffs have brought; see also infra apps. A and B for a discussion of the cases and
statutes.
228. See supra notes 60-82, 110-44, and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 145-68 and accompanying text.
230. See supra part VI.A.2.
231. See supra part VI.B-C.
232. See supra part VI.A.3.
233. See supra part VI.A.3.
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Statutory restrictions generally advance more than this single purpose,
however, and careful legislative drafting to clarify other purposes will
easily circumvent challenges. 23 Nevertheless, until the time when all
courts agree, statutes that regulate punitive damages awards will con-
tinue to be the battleground for the ongoing struggle between the
legislature restricting the awards, and the plaintiffs who accordingly
receive less.
234. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
1995] 447
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
APPENDIX A
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS
ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS
Date State Case Holding
4/10/90 Georgia McBride v. Statute diverting a portion
General Motors of punitive damages award
Corp., 737 F. to state fund violates
Supp. 1563 federal and state due
(M.D. Ga. process, equal protection,
1990). and excessive fines rights.
9/23/91 Colorado Kirk v. Denver Statute diverting a portion
Publishing Co., of punitive damages
818 P.2d 262 awards into a state fund is
(Colo. 1991) (en an unconstitutional taking
banc), under federal and state
constitutions.
7/17/91 Iowa Shepherd Statute diverting a portion
Components v. of punitive damages
Brice Petrides- awards into a state fund
Donohue & does not violate equal
Assocs., Inc., protection or due process.
473 N.W.2d
612 (Iowa
1991).
12/2/91 Georgia Bagley v. Shortt, $250,000 statutory cap
410 S.E.2d 738 does not violate due
(Ga. 1991). process, equal protection
or right of access to the
courts.
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11/10/92 Virginia Wackenhut $350,000 state statutory
Applied cap without exceptions
Technologies does not violate state or
Ctr., Inc. v. federal due process rights.
Sygnetron
Protection
Sys., Inc., 979
F.2d 980 (4th
Cir. 1992).
11/12/92 Florida Gordon v. State, Statute diverting a portion
608 So. 2d 800 of punitive damages
(Fla. 1992) (per awards into a state fund
curiam), cert. does not violate due
denied, 113 S. process, right to trial by
Ct. 1647 (1993). jury, or equal protection.
6/25/93 Alabama Henderson v. $250,000 state statutory
Alabama Power cap violates a plaintiff's
Co., 627 So. 2d right to trial by jury.
878 (Ala. 1993).
11/22/93 Georgia Mack Trucks, Statute diverting a portion
Inc. v. Conkle, of punitive damages
436 S.E.2d 635 awards into a state fund
(Ga. 1993). does not violate state or
federal due process or
equal protection rights.
11/22/93 Georgia State v. Moseley, Statute diverting a portion
436 S.E.2d 632 of punitive damages
(Ga. 1993) (all awards into a state fund
concurring), cert. does not violate the right
denied, 114 S. to ajury trial.
Ct. 2101 (1994).
12/30/93 Kansas Smith v. Printup, Statute requiring a judge to
866 P.2d 985 award punitive damages
(Kan. 1993). does not violate state or
federal due process or
equal protection rights; nor
does it violate the state
right to a trial by jury.
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Spaur v. Owens-
Coming
Fiberglas Corp.,
510 N.W.2d 854
(Iowa 1994).
Statute diverting a portion
of punitive damages
awards into a state fund
does not violate the
defendant's due process
rights, nor his or her right
azainst double ieopardv.
450
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APPENDIX B
STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES
AWARDS
State Statute Section Statute Content
Alabama ALA. CODE § 6-11- $250,000 cap on punitive
21 (1993). damages, with certain
enumerated exceptions.
Alaska ALASKA STAT. No punitive damages unless
§ 09.17.020 (1994). supported by clear and
convincing evidence.
Arizona No limitations.
Arkansas ARK. CODE ANN. Punitive damages awarded by
§ 16-64-123 (Michie ury unless erroneous
1987). instruction, jury passion or
prejudice.
California No limitations.
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. Where plaintiff can prove the
ANN. § 13-21-102 defendant acted with fraud,
(West 1989). malice, or willful and wanton
conduct punitive damages
awards limited to the amount
of actual damages; placing
one-third of the award into a
state general fund.
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. Limited to twice actual
ANN. § 52-240b damages in product liability
(West 1991). litigation.
Delaware No limitations.
Florida FLA. STAT. ANN. Three times compensatory
§ 768.73 (West damages, except where can
Supp. 1995). be shown by clear and
convincing evidence that facts
and circumstances warrant
exceeding limit; 35% to state
general funds.
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Georgia GA. CODE ANN. Imposing $250,000 cap for
§ 51-12-5.1 (Supp. all suits other than those
1994). alleging product liability or
intent to harm; for product
liability actions, one award
per defendant and 75% of the
award paid into the state
treasury.
Hawaii No limitations.
Idaho IDAHO CODE No punitive damages unless
§ 6-1604 (1990). maliciousness proven by
preponderance of evidence.
Illinois ILL. COMP. STAT. Court has discretion to
ANN. ch. 735, § 5/2- apportion punitive damages
1207 (West 1992 & award to Department of
Supp. 1994). Rehabilitation.
Indiana No limitations.
Iowa IOWA CODE ANN. 75% of the award to civil
§ 668A.1(2)(b) (West reparation trust fund for
1987). indigent civil litigation when
defendant's act not directed
specifically at plaintiff.
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. Punitive damages amount
§ 60-3702(a), (e) determined by judge, not
(1994). jury; statutory cap of the
lesser of $5 million or highest
annual gross income earned
by the defendant over the past
five years unless clearly
inadequate: then may award
50% net worth of the
defendant, or 1-1/2 times net
profit from wrongful act.
Kentucky No limitations.
Louisiana No limitations.
Maine No limitations.
Maryland No limitations.
Massachu- No limitations.
setts
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Michigan No limitations.
Minnesota No limitations.
Mississippi No limitations.
Missouri Mo. ANN. STAT. 50% of punitive damages
§ 537.675(2) award to Tort Victims'
(Vernon 1988). Compensation Fund.
Montana No limitations.
Nebraska No limitations.
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. Three times compensatory
ANN. § 42.005 when compensatory exceeds
(Michie Supp. 1993). $100,000; $300,000 cap
when actual damages are less
than $100,000.
New N.H. REV. STAT. Punitive damages outlawed
Hampshire ANN. § 507:16 by statute.
(Supp. 1994).
New Jersey No limitations.
New Mexico No limitations.
New York N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. 20% of punitive damages
& R. § 8701 awards payable to state. The
(McKinney Supp. statutory cap expired on April
1995). 1, 1994.
North No limitations.
Carolina
North Dakota N.D. CENT. CODE Punitive damages limited to
§ 32-03.2-11(4) $250,000 or twice
(Supp. 1993). compensatory, whichever is
greater.
Ohio No limitations.
Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. ANN. Plaintiff must prove oppres-
tit. 23, § 9 (West sion, fraud, or malice to
1987). receive punitive damages and
limiting any award to the
amount of compensatory
damages, with exceptions.
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. 50% payable to Criminal
§ 18.540(1)(c) Injuries Compensation
(Supp. 1994). Account after attorney fees.
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Pennsylvania No limitations.
Puerto Rico No limitations.
Rhode Island No limitations.
South No limitations.
Carolina
South Dakota S.D. CODIFIED LAWS Punitive damages only as
ANN. § 21-1-4 provided by statute.
____ __ ___(1987). _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Tennessee No limitations.
Texas TEX. CIV. PRAC. & $200,000 cap or four times
REM. CODE ANN. actual damages, whichever is
§ § 41.007, .008 greater. Cap not applicable to
(West Supp. 1995). intentional torts.
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. 50% of punitive damages in
§ 78-18-1(3) (1992). excess of $20,000, after
attorneys fees and costs,
remitted to Treasury for
payment into General Fund.
Vermont No limitations.
Virginia VA. CODE ANN. $350,000 cap on all punitive
§ 8.01-38.1 (Michie damages awards.
1992).
Virgin Islands No limitations.
Washington No limitations.
West Virginia No limitations.
Wisconsin No limitations.
Wyoming No limitations.
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